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defenses benefit or harm target corporations’ shareholders or society generally.  
Much of the disagreement surrounding takeover defenses stems from the lack of 
a fully developed formal analytical framework for considering their effects.  Our 
Article presents several formal models built upon a common core of assumptions 
that together create such a theoretical framework.  These models incorporate the 
reality that target corporate insiders have superior information about the target 
but are imperfect agents of its shareholders.  They suggest that modern defenses 
enable target shareholders to extract value from acquirers by empowering corpo-
rate insiders, but that takeover defenses do not benefit society as a whole.  They 
also help explain why corporations with different characteristics may choose to 
adopt varying levels of takeover defenses.  Our findings have implications for 
the longstanding debate about who is best served by state-level control of corpo-
rate law and the desirability of increased federal involvement in corporate law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate takeovers have occupied a prominent position in the 
popular imagination, the financial press, and corporate law scholarship 
for a generation.1  Yet despite all the thought and ink that have been 
devoted to analyzing takeovers, many questions remain unsettled.  
There is no consensus on the systemic effects of takeover defenses in 
general, or of the most important defense mechanism—the share-
holder rights plan or “poison pill”—in particular.  Scholars disagree on 
why different public firms exhibit varying levels of takeover defenses, 
what causes these levels to change over time, and whether the interests 
of shareholders or managers determine the level of takeover defenses 
that a firm adopts.  These unresolved questions have fueled the debate 
about whether regulatory competition encourages states to enact so-
cially optimal corporate laws, as well as the related issue of what role, if 
any, the federal government should play in corporate law. 
Much of the disagreement surrounding takeover defenses stems 
from the lack of a fully developed formal analytical framework for con-
sidering their effects.  Although a significant number of legal and eco-
nomic academic papers have discussed takeover defenses from a theo-
retical perspective,2 very few have included formal models.3  Those that 
 
1 Popular works about corporate takeovers abound.  See, e.g., BRYAN BURROUGH & 
JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE:  THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO 477-505 (First Col-
lins 2008) (1990) (providing an investigative account of the takeover of RJR Nabisco in 
1988); WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1987) (depicting the story of the fictional 
corporate raider Gordon Gekko).  
2 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1034-50 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auc-
tions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3-9 (1982); Mark Gordon, Take-
over Defenses Work.  Is That Such a Bad Thing?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 819, 827-28 (2002); Lynn 
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have proposed formal models have only focused on certain facets of 
the takeover market, which has limited those models’ applicability.4 
Empirical investigations into the effects of takeover defenses on 
firm performance have failed to resolve these debates.  Given the lack 
of theoretical guidance, it is not surprising that these investigations 
have yielded little insight.5  Nonetheless, the sheer magnitude of varia-
tion in the empirical findings is shocking.  As one commentator has 
stated, 
[S]tudies of [takeover defenses] have been remarkably unproductive 
over the past twenty years.  Not a single strong finding has been con-
firmed in other studies.  Little or no consensus exists on why [takeover 
defenses] are adopted or what effects they have.  Given that as much ac-
ademic energy has been poured into studying [takeover defenses] as in-
to almost any other area of applied financial economics, the dearth of 
results is astonishing, and itself in need of explanation.
6
 
This Article attempts to fill this gap in the dialogue by presenting 
several formal models, built upon a common core of assumptions.  
Taken together, these models create a theoretical framework for ana-
lyzing the effects of different levels of takeover defenses.  They are the 
first models of modern takeover defenses to incorporate the widely 
accepted propositions that a target corporation’s managers and direc-
tors have the best information about the target and are unfaithful 
agents of its shareholders. 
These models yield many novel and important insights.  They sug-
gest that poison pills enable target shareholders to extract value from 
 
A. Stout, Do Antitakeover Defenses Decrease Shareholder Wealth?  The Ex Post/Ex Ante Valua-
tion Problem, 55 STAN. L. REV. 845, 847-50 (2002). 
3 Cf. Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 YALE L.J. 
621, 622 (2003) (stating that the claim that defenses allow targets to extract higher 
premiums from acquirers has “never [been] subjected to a careful theoretical analysis”). 
4 See David Austen-Smith & Patricia C. O’Brien, Takeover Defences and Shareholder 
Voting, 59 ECONOMICA 199, 202-08 (1992) (modeling defensive maneuvers that require 
shareholder approval); Jeremy Bulow et al., Toeholds and Takeovers, 107 J. POL. ECON. 
427, 432-38 (1999) (modeling the impact of a toehold—the interest a bidder acquires in 
a target pre-takeover—on the behavior of the bidder and its competitors in a takeover 
battle); Eitan Goldman & Jun Qian, Optimal Toeholds in Takeover Contests, 77 J. FIN. 
ECON. 321, 327-33 (2005) (modeling a similar idea to explain that optimal toeholds 
may be small percentage ownerships); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Greenmail, 
White Knights, and Shareholders’ Interests, 17 RAND J. ECON. 293, 295-98 (1986) (modeling 
the phenomenon of greenmail). 
5 In Sections I.B and I.D, we provide an analytical framework suitable to guide 
empirical investigations.  
6 John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill:  A Critique of the Scien-
tific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 317 (2000).  
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acquirers by empowering corporate insiders.  Even though these in-
siders are unfaithful agents of the shareholders, their superior infor-
mation and higher reservation price can ultimately redound to the 
shareholders’ benefit. 
Our models also provide an explanation for the diverse levels of 
takeover defenses that different public corporations exhibit.  They 
predict that the level of takeover defenses preferred by both share-
holders and managers will vary depending upon several firm-specific 
characteristics.  These characteristics include the degree of uncertainty 
about the value of the firm as a going concern, the potential synergy 
gains that the firm offers potential acquirers, and the degree to which 
the firm’s managers are faithful agents of the shareholders.  Corpora-
tions for which an acquirer is likely to pay the highest premiums are 
likely to elect higher levels of takeover defenses. 
Unlike previous theories, our models predict that shareholders 
will never choose the lowest possible level of takeover defenses and 
that managers will not always choose the highest possible level.  
Therefore, the diversity of defense levels that corporations adopt pos-
es no challenge to theories that shareholders control choices of de-
fense levels or to theories that managers control such choices.  Fur-
ther, the models suggest that, with respect to takeover defenses, the 
interests of both shareholders and managers diverge from those of so-
ciety.  This highlights the fact that, even if regulatory competition cre-
ates a “race to the top,” it is a race with respect to shareholder inter-
ests and not with respect to those of society.  These findings have 
significant implications for the optimal scope of federal involvement 
in corporate law.  Our models also provide several testable hypotheses 
to guide future empirical work. 
This Article begins with a short overview of the conceptual frame-
work of the public firm and modern takeover defenses.  Part II then 
presents and analyzes several formal game theoretic models, using re-
peated illustrative numerical examples.  Part III discusses some addi-
tional implications of these models, compares their predictions to 
what the existing body of empirical literature has documented, and 
suggests further empirical work that could be done to test these mod-
els.  We also include a mathematical appendix for more technically 
inclined readers. 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
Before presenting formal models, it is worth providing some back-
ground on how scholars conceptualize the modern public corporation, 
as well as how the poison pill and the staggered board work in practice. 
A.  Conceptual Framework of the Public Firm 
The chief lens through which corporate law views the corporation 
envisions shareholders as principals and corporate managers as their 
agents.7  Like most real-world agents, managers are not perfectly faith-
ful to their principals.  Their incentives are likely to diverge from 
those of the shareholders8 and, when this happens, managers may be 
expected to pursue their own interests at the shareholders’ expense.9  
These phenomena are known as “agency costs.”10 
A variety of market and legal mechanisms help discipline manag-
ers and reduce agency costs.  The capital, product, and labor markets 
all impose constraints on managers.11  Much of the law that governs 
the structure of business associations is geared toward this concern.12  
For example, corporate law imposes a duty of loyalty on corporate 
managers that prohibits them from self-dealing to the detriment of 
the shareholders.13 
 
7 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 26-27 (2002) 
(providing background information about economic theories of the business firm).  
8 Id. at 207. 
9 See Jay C. Hartzell et al., What’s in It for Me?  CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired, 17 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 37, 59 (2004) (providing evidence that target shareholders’ gains are smaller 
when the merger gives the target CEO personal benefits); Julie Wulf, Do CEOs in Mergers 
Trade Power for Premium?  Evidence from “Mergers of Equals,” 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 60, 96 
(2004) (finding that, in deals in which target CEOs obtain greater post-merger control 
rights, target shareholders obtain a smaller proportion of joint gains); see also Thomas A. 
Smith, The Passion of Professor Fischel:  Defending Milken’s Financial Revolution, 22 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 1041, 1043 (1997) (book review) (describing how, before RJR Nabisco’s 
well-known takeover, its CEO “was famous for squandering corporate cash on perquisites 
for himself and his cronies” and “brought [in] celebrity athletes at great expense to play 
golf and party with RJR executives”). 
10 See, e.g., DONALD RUTHERFORD, DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 10 (1992) (defining 
the term “agency cost” as a “cost arising from a contractual relationship between a 
principal and an agent”). 
11 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 207. 
12 Id.  
13 Id. at 306-07. 
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One of corporate law’s most important mechanisms for reducing 
agency costs is the board of directors.14  The corporation’s sharehold-
ers elect its directors, who are legally obligated to monitor the manag-
ers and protect the shareholders’ interests.15  The law gives directors 
vast power over the corporation, including the power to hire and fire 
the corporation’s chief executive officer.16 
Yet despite the board’s great power, it is an imperfect monitoring 
device.  The board frequently includes members of management, or 
“inside directors,” and the CEO often serves as its chairman.17  Non-
manager directors, also called “outside directors” or “independent di-
rectors,” may be dependent on the managers for information about 
the company’s operations.18  In addition, the board is a body com-
posed of agents, and is itself susceptible to agency costs. 
Another important mechanism for constraining the behavior of 
corporate managers is the threat of a corporate takeover.  If a poten-
tial acquirer—be it a competitor, investment fund, or otherwise—
determines that a public corporation is being mismanaged, it may 
seek to buy up that corporation’s stock from its current shareholders.19  
If successful, the buyer would be a majority shareholder and would 
have the power to install a new board of directors, remove the existing 
managers, and install new, better managers who would run the corpo-
 
14 See Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple Roles of Corporate Boards of Directors, 40 SAN DIE-
GO L. REV. 781, 801-04 (2003) (“Boards of directors are intended to ensure that man-
agers act in the interests of shareholders rather than in their own personal interests.”). 
15 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
16 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(b) (2010); Dallas, supra note 14, at 801-04.  
17 See Splitting Up the Roles of CEO and Chairman:  Reform or Red Herring?, 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (June 2, 2004), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/createpdf. 
cfm?articleid=987 (explaining that in 2004 the same person held the posts of both CEO 
and chairperson at over seventy-five percent of S&P 500 companies). 
18 Margaret McCabe & Margaret Nowak, The Independent Director on the Board of 
Company Directors, 23 MANAGERIAL AUDITING J. 545, 555 (2008). 
19 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control:  
The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 6 (1983) (characterizing managerial competi-
tion as a way to limit divergence from policies that maximize shareholder wealth); An-
drei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Stock Market Driven Acquisitions, 70 J. FIN. ECON. 295, 
296-97 (2003) (arguing that a takeover and subsequent reorganization can occur when 
rational managers recognize inefficiency in other businesses); J. Wickramanayake & 
Andrew Wood, Determinants of Acquisition Premiums:  Empirical Evidence from Min-
ing Industry in Australia and Canada 6 (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
www.efmaefm.org/0efmameetings/efma%20annual%20meetings/2009-milan/412.pdf 
(identifying the removal of inefficient management as a principal reason for takeovers).  
But cf. Martin Bugeja & Terry Walter, An Empirical Analysis of Some Determinants of the Target 
Shareholder Premium in Takeovers, ACCT. & FIN., Nov. 1995, at 33, 34-36, 56 (testing the 
proposition that bad management drives takeovers but not finding support). 
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ration more efficiently.  Equipped with better management, the new 
corporation would be more valuable than the old corporation, which 
would enable the acquirer to make a profit on the transaction.20  The 
threat that the corporation will be acquired, and that the managers 
will lose their jobs,21 encourages the managers to serve the sharehold-
ers’ interests.22  In essence, the existing managers of public corpora-
tions must compete against potential acquirers for the right to man-
age corporate resources; this concept is often referred to as “the 
market for corporate control.”23 
Not surprisingly, shareholders and managers have very different at-
titudes toward the market for corporate control. Shareholders generally 
want to make sure that a corporation is susceptible to a takeover.  The 
possibility of a takeover helps keep managers disciplined and, if a 
takeover does occur, the shareholders will often receive a significant 
premium.24  Managers, on the other hand, have almost diametrically 
opposite incentives.  They would prefer their behavior to be as uncon-
strained as possible and dislike takeovers because they often lose their 
jobs or suffer other career setbacks when such transactions take 
place.25  Accordingly, managers tend to be significantly more resistant 
to takeovers than shareholders are.26 
 
20 See Marcia Millon Cornett et al., Performance Changes Around Bank Mergers:  Reve-
nue Enhancements Versus Cost Reductions, 38 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 1013, 1049 
(2006) (finding that the “industry-adjusted operating performance of merged banks 
increases significantly after a merger”); Jensen & Ruback, supra note 19, at 6, 8 (identi-
fying utilization of better management as a source of takeover gains). 
21 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Universal Banks Are Not the Answer to 
America’s Corporate Governance “Problem”:  A Look at Germany, Japan, and the U.S. (explaining 
that middle managers are often laid off following mergers), in THE REVOLUTION IN COR-
PORATE FINANCE 552, 563 ( Joel M. Stern & Donald H. Chew, Jr. eds., 4th ed. 2003). 
22 See Jensen & Ruback, supra note 19, at 29-30 (identifying the threat of a takeover 
as an external control mechanism that incentivizes managers to serve shareholders’ 
interests). 
23 Id. at 6. 
24 See, e.g., B. Espen Eckbo, Bidding Strategies and Takeover Premiums:  A Review, 15 J. 
CORP. FIN. 149, 154-55 (2009) (finding that average offer premiums exceed forty per-
cent of the target share price prior to a takeover bid’s announcement); Sara B. Moeller 
et al., Firm Size and the Gains from Acquisitions, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 201, 220 (2004) (finding 
that the average and median premiums paid for U.S. public acquisitions announced 
between 1980 and 2001 were, respectively, sixty-eight and sixty-one percent for large 
firms and sixty-two and fifty-two percent for small firms). 
25 See Kenneth J. Martin & John J. McConnell, Corporate Performance, Corporate 
Takeovers and Management Turnover, 46 J. FIN. 671, 672 (1991) (finding that “the turnover 
rate for the top executive of target firms increases dramatically following successful ten-
der offer-takeovers”); James P. Walsh, Top Management Turnover Following Mergers and Ac-
quisitions, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 173, 179-80 (1988) (“Top management turnover rates 
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Managers use a number of mechanisms to resist takeovers.  These 
mechanisms include blank-check preferred stock,27 share repurchase 
programs,28 and corporate charter provisions that impose restrictions 
on a majority shareholder.29  However, the most important modern 
antitakeover device is the poison pill.30 
B.  Poison Pills 
The poison pill, formally known as a “shareholder rights plan,”31 was 
invented in the 1980s by Martin Lipton of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & 
Katz.32  Since the Delaware Supreme Court upheld their validity in 
1985,33 poison pills have become increasingly commonplace.34  As long 
 
following a merger or acquisition are significantly higher than normal top management 
turnover rates.”); see also supra note 21.  
26 See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 563-64 (noting that managers have even 
turned to state legislators to enact antitakeover statutes). 
27 See Brent W. Ambrose & William L. Megginson, The Role of Asset Structure, Owner-
ship Structure, and Takeover Defenses in Determining Acquisition Likelihood, 27 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 575, 584-85 (1992) (explaining that blank-check preferred 
stock—i.e., stock whose terms the board can dictate and that it can issue without 
shareholder approval—can be used to modify a firm’s capital structure to discourage a 
takeover attempt). 
28 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 692 (explaining that stock repurchase programs 
involve buying target shares on the open market through a regular program and can 
be used to resist takeovers); ALAN PALMITER & FRANK PARTNOY, CORPORATIONS:  A 
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 922 (2010) (describing the antitakeover effects of repur-
chase programs).   
29 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 677-79 (discussing supermajority vote require-
ments).  By limiting the powers of a majority shareholder, these provisions make be-
coming a majority shareholder less desirable.  Id. 
30 See Coates, supra note 6, at 320-25 (arguing that most other takeover defenses 
“have ceased to be of much importance” due to the rise of poison pills); Subramanian, 
supra note 3, at 625 (“[T]he poison pill is by far the most important defense today.”); 
cf. ARTHUR FLEISCHER, JR., TENDER OFFERS:  DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND PLANNING 7 
n.23 (1981) (citing numerous sources that criticize the effectiveness of defensive char-
ter provisions).  
31 PALMITER & PARTNOY, supra note 28, at 919-20. 
32 A Tough and Inventive Corporate Lawyer, WHARTON SCH. U. PA., http://www. 
wharton.upenn.edu/125anniversaryissue/lipton.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2011). 
33 Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985). 
34 Twenty-eight states have statutes explicitly authorizing poison pills.  U.S. Proxy Vot-
ing Manual:  Poison Pill Endorsements, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, http:// 
governanceanalytics.com/content/menutop/content/subscription/usvmfiles/x6383.html 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2011).  Others, like Delaware, have recognized them by judicial deci-
sion.  See, e.g., Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357.  Thousands of public corporations currently have 
poison pills in effect.  U.S. Proxy Voting Manual:  Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans), 
INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, http://governanceanalytics.com/content/ 
menutop/content/subscription/usvmfiles/x6210.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).   
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as the jurisdiction in which the corporation is incorporated permits poi-
son pills, a board of directors generally has the ability to enact a poison 
pill quickly and easily.35  Since no state has outlawed poison pills,36 al-
most every U.S. public company essentially operates under a “shadow 
poison pill” at all times,37 and so any would-be acquirers must act ac-
cordingly. 
The key concept behind the poison pill is that it deters a potential 
acquirer from purchasing the stock of the target by making a takeover 
unprofitable.  Poison pills generally come in one of two varieties:  “flip-
in” and “flip-over.”  They have similar effects and are often adopted in 
tandem.38  When triggered, “flip-in” poison pills enable shareholders of 
the target—other than the acquirer and its affiliates—to purchase ad-
ditional shares in the target for less than their actual value.39  By buy-
ing new target stock at a discount, the existing target shareholders se-
verely dilute the value of the would-be acquirer’s ownership stake in 
the target.40  These rights are usually triggered by the acquirer reach-
ing a particular threshold of target stock ownership, commonly set be-
tween ten and twenty percent.41  “Flip-over” poison pills are similar to 
“flip-in” poison pills, except that instead of enabling shareholders of 
the target—again, not including the acquirer or its affiliates—to pur-
chase target stock at below-market prices, they enable shareholders to 
purchase stock in an acquiring company upon the merger of the tar-
get into the acquirer.42 
Thus, both poison pill varieties menace an acquirer with the pro-
spect of severely diluting its equity investment.43  Accordingly, acquir-
 
35 See Subramanian, supra note 3, at 625 (“Because a pill . . . is a dividend of rights 
to purchase stock, and the board has the exclusive authority to issue dividends, a pill 
can be adopted without a shareholder vote, in a matter of hours if necessary.” (foot-
note omitted)). 
36 Id.  But see id. (noting that flip-in poison pills are arguably not always valid in 
California). 
37 Coates, supra note 6, at 277. 
38 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 683-84. 
39 Id. at 684. 
40 Id. 
41 Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards:  
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 904 (2002); accord Subramanian, supra 
note 3, at 625. 
42 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 681. 
43 For example, suppose TargetCo stock is worth $10 per share with one million 
shares outstanding, representing a total value of $10 million, and that the acquisition 
of 10% of TargetCo’s outstanding shares triggers its poison pill.  Assume the poison 
pill allows each TargetCo shareholder—excluding the acquirer—to buy as many new 
common shares as it currently owns for $2 per share.  Buying 100,000 TargetCo shares 
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ers are careful to avoid “swallowing” the poison pill—that is, acquiring 
enough stock to trigger its dilutive provisions.44  In fact, bidders essen-
tially never trigger modern poison pills.45  As long as a poison pill re-
mains in place, a takeover of the target corporation is effectively im-
possible. 
Poison pills also include an additional feature:  the target’s board 
of directors may redeem (i.e., eliminate) a poison pill at little or no 
cost.46  These redemption provisions enable the target’s board to clear 
the way for acquisitions that it deems desirable and which the pill 
would otherwise prevent.47  However, the redemption provisions re-
quire the board of directors to take affirmative action, and courts 
generally give significant deference to a board’s decision not to re-
deem a poison pill.48  The poison pill therefore makes the board of di-
rectors the central focal point in a fight for control of the target. 
Accordingly, when a target corporation has adopted a poison pill, 
the acquirer will generally try to persuade the target’s board of direc-
 
will cost BuyerCo $1 million.  At that point, the other shareholders will exercise their 
rights and buy 900,000 new TargetCo shares for a total of $1.8 million.  TargetCo 
would then be worth $11.8 million ($10 million initially plus $1.8 million in new equi-
ty) and have 1.9 million outstanding shares.  BuyerCo would own a 5.3% ownership 
stake in TargetCo, worth about $625,000—far less than the $1 million BuyerCo paid. 
44 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 680-85. 
45 Bebchuk et al., supra note 41, at 904-05.  A bidder once intentionally triggered 
an early poison pill that only had negative effects if the acquirer attempted a freezeout 
merger.  Triggering it but not attempting a merger actually benefited the acquirer be-
cause it precluded the target from attracting a white knight (i.e., another bidder that 
target management preferred to that acquirer).  Stephen M. Bainbridge, Precommitment 
Strategies in Corporate Law:  The Case of Dead Hand and No Hand Pills, 29 J. CORP. L. 1, 10-
11 (2003).  More recently, Trilogy intentionally triggered a poison pill put in place by 
Selectica to protect its tax assets, apparently on the belief that the particular poison pill 
at issue was illegal.  See Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enters., No. 4241-VCN, 2010 WL 
703062, at *2, *8 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2010) (explaining that Joseph Liemandt, the 
founder of Trilogy and owner of eighty-six percent of its stock, triggered Selectica’s 
poison pill to demonstrate the illegality of “adopting a pill with such a low trigger”); 
Merle Erickson & Shane Heitzman, NOL Poison Pills:  Selectica v. Versata, 127 TAX 
NOTES 1369, 1369-70 (2010) (discussing Selectica’s attempt to protect its net operating 
losses through the implementation of a poison pill).  
46 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 684 (describing typical redemption provisions). 
47 See id. at 682 (noting that this allows pills to block takeovers the board does not 
like “while still allowing a friendly deal to be accomplished”). 
48 See, e.g., Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545, 1554-
55 (D. Del. 1995) (holding that a board’s good faith belief, based on reasonable inves-
tigation, that a takeover offer is not in the interests of the corporation is generally suf-
ficient); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1989) 
(“[T]he refusal to entertain an offer may comport with a valid exercise of a board’s 
business judgment.”). 
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tors to redeem the pill.49  This may take the form of direct negotia-
tions with the board itself, or negotiations with the target’s managers 
in an attempt to win their support.50  If the acquirer succeeds, the 
board redeems the poison pill and the acquirer proceeds with the 
takeover.  If the acquirer fails in this attempt, its next option is to try 
to gain control of the target’s board at the ballot box by launching a 
proxy fight in combination with a tender offer.51  If the proxy fight 
succeeds, the shareholders elect a new board, which then redeems the 
poison pill, clearing the way for the takeover.52 
Thus, while a board of directors has broad discretion to institute 
and maintain a poison pill,53 the possibility of a shareholder revolt at 
the ballot box creates a backstop to the directors’ potential abuse of 
their power.54  This “ballot box safety valve” provides a mechanism with 
which to overcome an entrenched board of directors that is not serving 
the interests of the shareholders.55  In addition, the threat of a ballot 
box revolt can increase a board’s willingness to redeem a poison pill.56 
In many cases, there are good reasons to expect the ballot box 
safety valve to work reasonably well.  By default, state law provides that a 
corporation’s directors all sit for election at the corporation’s annual 
shareholders’ meeting.57  Thus, an acquirer can capture control of the 
board by winning a single proxy fight on a prescribed date, known in 
advance, that is always less than a year away.  In addition, depending on 
a particular target’s bylaws, charter, and state of incorporation, the ac-
 
49 See G. William Schwert, Hostility in Takeovers:  In the Eyes of the Beholder?, 55 J. FIN. 
2599, 2599-601 (2000) (discussing how deals may shift between friendly and hostile 
postures). 
50 Id. at 2600. 
51 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 41, at 908 (“In the current legal regime, . . . if the 
board wants to maintain the pill and not sell to a hostile bidder, the only way to gain 
control passes through the ballot box.”).  
52 Id. at 907-09.  Some states allow pills that are especially difficult to remove, 
which further delays this process.  See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-646(B) (2006) (allow-
ing a board to limit certain parties’ ability to transfer or receive shares and to restrict 
any accompanying rights they might have); see also Bebchuk et al., supra note 41, at 905 
(noting the legalization of “no hand,” “dead hand,” and “slow hand” pills in Pennsyl-
vania, Maryland, and Georgia). 
53 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.  
54 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 41, at 907 (explaining how the mere presence of 
the ballot box safety valve encourages the board of directors to serve the shareholders’ 
interests).  
55 Id. at 909. 
56 See, e.g., id. (“[H]ow often managers will do the right thing will depend on the 
consequences they face when they do not do the right thing.”). 
57 Id. at 893. 
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quirer may be able to act even more quickly, either by calling a special 
shareholder meeting or by collecting written consents from the share-
holders to act in lieu of a meeting.58  Empirical evidence supports this, 
suggesting that the presence of a poison pill either does not reduce the 
likelihood of a takeover or only reduces it by a small amount.59 
C.  Effective Staggered Boards 
While the legal default rule is for directors to serve one-year terms,60 
states also allow an alternative known as a staggered or classified 
board.61  The directors of a corporation with a staggered board serve 
multi-year terms whose starting and ending dates are staggered relative 
to each other, so that only a fraction of the directors sit for election 
each year.  The most common arrangement is for directors to serve 
three-year terms, with one-third of directors being elected each year.62 
A staggered board interacts with a poison pill in an important way:  
because the entire board does not sit for election each year, it be-
comes harder for an acquirer to gain control of the target’s board of 
directors and remove its poison pill.63  This makes the ballot box safety 
valve less accessible.64 
 
58 Id. at 910.  
59 See Ambrose & Megginson, supra note 27, at 585, 587-88 (finding that “the exist-
ence of a poison pill defense is not associated with the probability of a takeover bid”); 
William J. Carney & Leonard A. Silverstein, The Illusory Protections of the Poison Pill, 79 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 179, 182-83 (2003) (contending that poison pills are a mild take-
over deterrent); Robert Comment & G. William Schwert, Poison or Placebo?  Evidence on 
the Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 36-37 
(1995) (finding “weak evidence” that poison pills effectively deter takeovers); Randall 
A. Heron & Erik Lie, On the Use of Poison Pills and Defensive Payouts by Takeover Targets, 79 
J. BUS. 1783, 1800 (2006) (concluding that “poison pills do not materially affect the 
probability of takeover success”). 
60 Bebchuk et al., supra note 41, at 893. 
61 GRANT A. GARTMAN & JACK D. ISAACS, INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CTR., 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STATE BY STATE:  A GUIDE TO SELECTED STATUTES, at ii, app. 
A-1 to -3 (1998); Bebchuk et al., supra note 41, at 893.  States’ rules pertaining to stag-
gered boards differ.  For example, Delaware permits three classes of directors, DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2010), but New York permits four, N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW 
§ 704(a) (McKinney 2003).  These differences are generally irrelevant for our purposes, 
however, as they have not affected acquirers’ ability to take over targets without man-
agement approval.  See Bebchuk et al., supra note 41, at 927-29 (finding no examples 
from any state of ballot box victories against a target with an effective staggered board).  
62 Bebchuk et al., supra note 41, at 893. 
63 Id. at 902-09. 
64 Id. 
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Not all staggered boards present identical obstacles to would-be 
acquirers.  For example, some corporations allow the shareholders to 
remove directors without cause at any time, giving the acquirer a 
route to remove recalcitrant directors without waiting for their terms 
to expire.65  In other instances, it may be possible for the acquirer to 
“pack the board” by increasing the number of directors and filling the 
newly created vacancies.66  In these instances, a staggered board and 
poison pill combination imposes only a slightly larger hurdle for an 
acquirer than a poison pill alone. 
A staggered board that a would-be acquirer cannot easily elimi-
nate or circumvent is known as an “effective staggered board” or 
“ESB.”67  Professor Lucian Bebchuk and others have found that the 
presence of an effective staggered board has dramatic implications for 
the availability of the ballot box safety valve.  They concluded that the 
ballot box was a viable mechanism for an acquirer to pursue an acqui-
sition when the target did not have an effective staggered board,68 but 
that it was completely foreclosed when the target had an effective 
staggered board.69  They were unable to identify a single instance in 
which an acquirer successfully used the ballot box to gain control of a 
target corporation with an effective staggered board.70 
D.  Takeover Defenses in the Academic Literature 
There has been a spirited debate in the academic literature over 
the societal merits of takeover defenses in general and poison pills in 
particular.  Some commentators have decried modern defenses, argu-
ing that they serve only to benefit managers by deterring takeovers, 
thereby impeding the market for corporate control.71 
 
65 Id. at 909-13. 
66 Id. at 910. 
67 Id. at 894. 
68 Id. at 929. 
69 Id. at 927-29. 
70 Id. at 928-29. 
71 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF CORPORATE LAW 168-74 (1991); Harry DeAngelo & Edward M. Rice, Antitake-
over Charter Amendments and Stockholder Wealth, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 329, 335 (1983); Frank 
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding 
to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1174-80 (1981); Alan Schwartz, Search Theory and 
the Tender Offer Auction, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 229, 229-51 (1986); see also Robert Daines & 
Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value?  Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 
17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 83 (2001) (“Takeover defenses are commonly thought . . . to 
be motivated by management’s interest in entrenching itself.”).  
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Supporters have countered that poison pills do provide a benefit 
by giving the target’s board of directors time to put the target up for 
auction.  Since the highest value-added acquirer—that is, the acquirer 
that would gain the most synergy from the acquisition—will be willing 
to pay the highest price, supporters reason that such an auction allows 
the most efficient user of the target’s assets to purchase the target.72 
Detractors have responded with two arguments:  First, federal reg-
ulations on tender offers are already sufficient to create auctions.73  Se-
cond, and more fundamentally, acquirers generally initiate corporate 
acquisitions, and they face significant search and transaction costs.74  
Forcing acquirers to compete in an auction for the target will diminish 
their gains from takeovers.  Thus, acquirers will have reduced incen-
tives to search for targets and engage in takeovers, which will lead to 
fewer takeovers.75  Detractors argue that it would be preferable to simp-
ly have acquirers purchase targets with low premiums and, if necessary, 
to have repeated sales of the target until its assets end up in the hands 
of the highest-value-added acquirers.76  This is an essentially empirical 
question, the answer to which remains unresolved. 
Takeover defenses also feature prominently in the long-running 
debate about how state-level control has affected the evolution of cor-
porate law.  Some have argued that states compete for corporate char-
ters, as they provide a state with a source of revenue and income for 
that state’s lawyers.77 
 
72 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 1048; Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitat-
ing Competing Tender Offers:  A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23, 39 (1982); 
Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 
STAN. L. REV. 51, 62 (1982); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations:  The 
Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 848-55 (1981) [here-
inafter Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations]. 
73 Cf. Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz, Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regu-
lation, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 27, 27 n.1 (1991) (discussing the Williams Act). 
74 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71, at 1178-79; Schwartz, supra note 71, at 233-
34.  
75 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71, at 1189-90; Schwartz, supra note 71, at 237. 
76 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 14-15.  Part of this argument is that vari-
ous target corporation assets are likely to have different highest value-added users.  Id.  
77 See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 6-8 
(1993) (discussing state competition and finding that on average from 1960 to 1990 
over fifteen percent of Delaware’s tax revenue came from incorporation fees); William 
L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:  Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 668 
(1974) (explaining that Delaware’s corporate law, in addition to raising revenue for 
the state, creates business for the bar that amounts to a “vested interest”); Roberta Ro-
mano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709, 727 (1987) 
(commenting that the “only groups who are active in the enactment of second genera-
tion takeover statutes are business organizations and the bar”); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., 
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Among those who subscribe to this view, one school of thought 
argues that shareholders choose the state in which a corporation will 
incorporate.  Accordingly, states compete to provide the best legal re-
gime for shareholders.  This leads to a “race to the top” in which, over 
time, states choose corporate laws that maximize social welfare.78 
Another school of thought reasons that it is managers, not share-
holders, who choose the state of incorporation.  This school argues 
that managers prefer laws that best enable them to extract benefits 
from their offices, generally at the expense of the shareholders.  This 
leads states to compete in crafting the worst corporate laws, creating a 
“race to the bottom.”79 
State laws affecting the market for corporate control have been 
central to this debate because they are thought to be an area in which 
shareholders’ and managers’ interests are directly opposed.  As noted 
previously, shareholders tend to favor takeovers while managers do 
not.80  While the race to the bottom argument has largely been reject-
ed,81 some studies have shown that states that offer higher levels of 
 
State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 255 
(1977) (noting that the purpose of state corporate code provisions has been to produce 
tax revenues and that, in Delaware, corporate lawyers have benefited). 
78 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 71, at 212-27 (arguing that in theory a 
“race for the bottom” cannot exist and that competition, if not necessarily driving laws 
“to the top,” does drive them up and thus benefits investors); ROMANO, supra note 77, 
at 148-49 (finding that state competition is the “genius of American corporate law” in 
that it makes states “sensitive to investor concerns,” thereby fueling a “race . . . for the 
top and not the bottom in the production of corporate laws”); Peter Dodd & Richard 
Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters:  “Unhealthy Competition” Versus Federal Regula-
tion, 53 J. BUS. 259, 260-61 (1980) (explaining that “investors weigh the costs and bene-
fits of alternative state corporation codes when they consider investments in securities 
of firms incorporated in particular states” and finding that shareholders benefit even 
when management chooses the state of incorporation). 
79 See Cary, supra note 77, at 670-85 (contending that Delaware has created a cor-
porate legal climate favorable to management through legislative enactments and ju-
dicial rulings and claiming that Delaware is “in the lead” in the “race for the bottom”); 
see also Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 545, 
555-57 (1984) (arguing that corporate law favors management over shareholder inter-
ests and that reforms are unlikely because managers will “flee” to other states). 
80 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.  
81 See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 14-15 (stating that empirical research does 
not support the race to the bottom view); ROMANO, supra note 77, at 14-15 (explaining 
how the consensus on the race to the bottom changed following Ralph Winter’s 1977 
article challenging this view (citing Winter, supra note 77, at 289-92)); Romano, supra 
note 77, at 711-12 (maintaining that criticism of race to the bottom explanations has 
been “devastating” because “managers are compelled, by natural selection, to seek the 
state whose laws are more favorable to shareholders”).  
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protection against takeovers are better able to attract incorporations.82  
Thus, commentators still debate whether this phenomenon applies to 
state laws governing takeovers and takeover defenses.83 
Yet both the race to the top and race to the bottom theories must 
be reconciled with the significantly varied levels of takeover defenses 
that different corporations utilize.84  Presumably, if managers disfavor 
takeovers, they would choose the highest possible level of defenses.  
Similarly, if shareholders favor takeovers, they might be expected to 
choose the lowest possible level of defenses.  Shareholders may prefer a 
somewhat higher level of defenses if it increases their (or their agents’) 
leverage in negotiations with acquirers,85 but it is unclear why this would 
produce the diversity of defense levels that corporations exhibit. 
 
82 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 
J.L. & ECON. 383, 421 (2003) (finding that states with numerous antitakeover statutes 
are “more successful in the incorporation market—both in retaining in-state firms and 
in attracting out-of-state incorporations”); see also Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of 
Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice:  Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover 
Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1801, 1840 (2002) (finding that a company 
headquartered in a state with control-share acquisition, business-combination, and pill-
validation statutes is twenty-six percent “more likely to be incorporated in that state 
than a company headquartered in a state without any of these statutes”). 
83 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 82, at 404-11 (arguing that “[o]ne of the 
most important and hotly debated subjects in corporate law has been the regulation of 
hostile takeovers” and outlining the positions in the debate regarding antitakeover 
protections); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate 
Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 703-04 (2002) (“Whether modern antitakeover statutes have 
the effect of attracting incorporations is empirically disputed.”); Romano, supra note 
77, at 725-31 (“The impact of takeover statutes remains . . . a troubling open ques-
tion.”); Subramanian, supra note 82, at 1840-41, 1852-53 (finding that managers mi-
grate to states with antitakeover statutes, which supports a race to the bottom, but also 
that managers do not migrate toward, and may migrate away from, those states with 
the strongest takeover laws). 
84 See Coates, supra note 6, at 324 fig.1 (showing the diversity of defense levels 
among a sample of two thousand large public firms and that in 1996, for example, ap-
proximately four hundred and fifty firms had staggered boards, three hundred had 
fair price provisions, and one hundred required a supermajority vote to approve a 
merger); Daines & Klausner, supra note 71, at 85 (finding that half their sample of 
firms going public had the strongest level of protection and roughly two-thirds had 
significant defenses); Michael Klausner, Institutional Shareholders, Private Equity, and Anti-
takeover Protection at the IPO Stage, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 763 (2003) (“Between 1987 
and 1999, approximately 6000 firms went public, and roughly half had staggered 
boards.” (footnote omitted)); Seoungpil Ahn et al., The Differential Effects of Classi-
fied Boards on Firm Value 1 ( July 17, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265078 (“[O]ver 60% of large publicly traded U.S. firms 
currently maintain classified boards and . . . this proportion has remained fairly stable 
over the last decade.”). 
85 Cf. Daines & Klausner, supra note 71, at 98-99 (discussing the bargaining power 
hypothesis, which states that antitakeover provisions “can increase share value by en-
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Many empirical studies have attempted to explain these patterns by 
looking for traits common to firms that have adopted poison pills86 or 
other antitakeover devices.87  Unfortunately, the results of these studies 
vary widely.  For example, studies do not agree on whether companies 
that adopt poison pills tend to be above- or below-average performers.88  
 
hancing the bargaining power of the firm’s management when a bid is made, thereby 
enabling management to extract a higher price from a bidder”). 
86 Studies have looked at factors such as firm size, board composition, and stock 
ownership, among other factors.  See, e.g., Jamil Aboumeri, Poison Pills and Shareholder 
Value, 1992-96, ASPEN LAW & BUS. CORP., Dec. 15, 1997; James A. Brickley et al., Outside 
Directors and the Adoption of Poison Pills, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 388-89 (1994); Comment & 
Schwert, supra note 59, at 23; Gerald F. Davis, Agents Without Principles?  The Spread of the 
Poison Pill Through the Intercorporate Network, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 583, 603-06 (1991); Ger-
ald F. Davis & Henrich R. Greve, Corporate Elite Networks and Governance Changes in the 
1980s, 103 AM. J. SOC. 1, 21-26 (1997); Richard J. Dowen et al., Poison Pills and Corporate 
Governance, 4 APPLIED FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1994); Rakesh Duggal & James A. Millar, 
Institutional Investors, Antitakeover Defenses and Success of Hostile Takeover Bids, 34 Q. REV. 
ECON. & FIN. 387, 399 (1994); Charmen Loh, The Influence of Outside Directors on the 
Adoption of Poison Pills, Q.J. BUS. & ECON., Winter 1994, at 3, 10; Paul H. Malatesta & 
Ralph A. Walkling, Poison Pill Securities:  Stockholder Wealth, Profitability, and Ownership 
Structure, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 347, 374 (1988); Paul Mallette & Karen L. Fowler, Effects of 
Board Composition and Stock Ownership on the Adoption of “Poison Pills,” 35 ACAD. MGMT. J. 
1010, 1028-31 (1992); Michael Ryngaert, The Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder 
Wealth, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 377, 387-88 (1988); John S. Strong & John R. Meyer, An Analy-
sis of Shareholder Rights Plans, 11 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 73, 75-78 (1990); 
Chamu Sundaramurthy, Corporate Governance Within the Context of Antitakeover Provisions, 
17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 377, 387-88 (1996); cf. Jennifer E. Bethel et al., Block Share Pur-
chases and Corporate Performance, 53 J. FIN. 605, 617 (1998) (finding that firms with poi-
son pills or other takeover deterrents were neither more nor less attractive to activist 
block share purchasers than firms without such defenses). 
87 See, e.g., Anup Agrawal & Gershon N. Mandelker, Large Shareholders and the Moni-
toring of Managers:  The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments, 25 J. FIN. & QUANTITA-
TIVE ANALYSIS 143, 145 (1990); Sanjai Bhagat & Richard H. Jefferis, Voting Power in the 
Proxy Process:  The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments, 30 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 195, 219 
(1991); Kenneth A. Borokhovich et al., CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments, 52 
J. FIN. 1495, 1503 (1997); Gregg A. Jarrell & Annette B. Poulsen, Shark Repellents and 
Stock Prices:  The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments Since 1980, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 127, 155 
(1987); Victoria B. McWilliams, Are Antitakeover Charter Amendments Good News or Bad 
News for Managers and Shareholders?, J. APPLIED BUS. RES., Spring 1994, at 82, 86. 
88 Compare Malatesta & Walkling, supra note 86, at 350, 372 (finding that firms 
adopting pills had lower profitability ratios, but not operating margins, in the year pre-
ceding pill adoption), and Strong & Meyer, supra note 86, at 76 (finding that pill-
adopting firms had lower price-to-earnings ratios, higher extraordinary items, and 
higher tax loss carryforwards), with John M. Bizjak & Christopher J. Marquette, Are 
Shareholder Proposals All Bark and No Bite?  Evidence from Shareholder Resolutions to Rescind 
Poison Pills, 33 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 499, 518-19 (1998) (finding no signifi-
cant relationship between pill adoption and pre- or post-adoption stock returns), Davis 
& Greve, supra note 86, at 23-25 (finding no significant relationship between market-to-
book ratio and pill adoption), Dowen et al., supra note 86, at 311 (same), and Mallette 
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Studies even disagree on the seemingly straightforward question of 
whether larger or smaller firms are more likely to adopt poison pills.89 
As Professor John Coates has noted, these inconsistent results may 
stem from the fact that these studies generally do not consider the 
looming presence of a “shadow pill.”90  Because almost all firms can 
easily adopt a poison pill if a bidder appears, there is arguably no sub-
stantive difference between firms with poison pills and those without; 
for most firms, adopting a poison pill merely sends a signal.91  This 
methodological concern potentially calls into question many poison 
pill studies.92 
Similarly, studies that focus on other takeover defenses often fail 
to fully account for the presence of a shadow poison pill,93 which ren-
ders many other defenses superfluous.94  For example, if an acquirer 
who gains control of the target’s board can remove a defense, it adds 
little additional protection beyond what the shadow poison pill al-
ready confers.95  More generally, studies often fail to account for inter-
actions between defenses.96 
More recent empirical studies have responded to these methodo-
logical critiques by focusing on takeover defenses at the IPO stage.97  
 
& Fowler, supra note 86, at 1025-27 (finding that firms adopting poison pills did not 
have lower returns on equity prior to pill adoption).  
89 Some studies have found that larger firms are more likely to adopt pill defenses.  
See, e.g., Aboumeri, supra note 86; Comment & Schwert, supra note 59, at 25.  Other 
studies have reached the opposite conclusion; that is, that smaller firms are more likely 
to adopt poison pills.  See, e.g., Davis, supra note 86, at 608; Mallette & Fowler, supra 
note 86, at 1027.  In contrast to these two groups of studies, some studies have found 
that firm size has no effect on the likelihood of pill adoption.  See, e.g., Malatesta & 
Walkling, supra note 86, at 370 n.22; Sundaramurthy, supra note 86, at 388 tbl.4.   
90 Coates, supra note 6, at 286-91. 
91 Id. at 297-99. 
92 See id. at 286-91 (arguing that “pill event studies suffer from a serious design 
flaw” in that they fail to take into account the effects of shadow pills). 
93 See id. at 320-25 (claiming that studies focusing on supermajority requirements 
and fair price provisions “are no longer relevant . . . in the era of the shadow pill”). 
94 See id. at 325 (noting the rarity with which fair price and supermajority charter 
amendments have been proposed and contending that “they have ceased to be of 
much importance in the shadow of the pill”). 
95 See id. at 325-28 (asserting, for example, that “[w]ithout the pill, the presence or 
absence of a classified board is largely irrelevant”). 
96 Id. 
97 See, e.g., Daines & Klausner, supra note 71, at 85 (examining charters at the IPO 
stage to “avoid[] the selection bias and mixed signals that are present in studies of 
[takeover defenses] that already public firms adopt by charter amendment”); Klaus-
ner, supra note 84, at 763 (attempting to explain firms’ silence on takeover-friendly 
charter provisions at the IPO stage); Arno Forst et al., Insider Entrenchment and CEO 
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One study by Professors Robert Daines and Michael Klausner consid-
ered the level of takeover defenses in the charters and bylaws of 310 
newly public firms and tested several possible explanations for the ob-
served variation.98  Daines and Klausner did not find evidence that the 
interests of a firm’s shareholders determined its level of takeover de-
fenses, but they did find that defenses were not correlated with indica-
tors of managerial rent-seeking.99  Another study by Klausner focused 
on newly public firms with private equity and leveraged-buyout firm in-
vestors and found that many potential rationales previously proposed 
to explain varied takeover defense levels—such as inducing founders 
to sell additional shares, preserving efficient private benefits, pre-IPO 
agency costs, and facilitating team production processes—did not fit 
the data.100  An empirical study by Professor Seoungpil Ahn and others 
found that certain firms—those with greater advisory needs and whose 
managers are easier to monitor—may benefit from having staggered 
boards, while other firms may not.101  While this study potentially offers 
insight into why different levels of defenses are optimal for different 
firms, it does not explain how a firm actually chooses its level of de-
fenses and, like previous works, it is in tension with both shareholder 
primacy and managerialist theories.102  Thus, none of these empirical 
studies suggests an explanation for the observed diversity of defense 
levels among public firms. 
 
Compensation:  Evidence from Initial Public Offering Firms 28-30 (Oct. 11, 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (finding that entrenchment decisions 
at the IPO stage heavily influence post-IPO CEO compensation). 
98 See Daines & Klausner, supra note 71, at 85, 110-13 (considering, among others, 
the “bargaining power, rational myopia, [and] private benefits hypotheses”).  
99 Id. at 110-11. 
100 Klausner, supra note 84, at 775-84; see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Why Firms 
Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 713, 723-28 (2003) (arguing that 
conflicting evidence on midstream and IPO behaviors cannot be easily explained by 
existing theories); Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses:  Some Empirical Evidence on 
Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 689-
703 (2003) (arguing that classical theories of agency cost-reduction cannot comforta-
bly explain empirical evidence as it relates to the directors of public firms and how 
they carry out their responsibilities).  
101 Ahn et al., supra note 84, at 8.  
102 If shareholders’ interests determine a corporation’s level of takeover defenses, 
one would not expect to see firms with staggered boards that are not benefitted by 
them.  If managers determine a corporation’s defense level, there should be some rea-
son why they prefer having staggered boards in some cases but not in others.  Ahn and 
others suggest staggered boards are likely to increase firm value when board stability 
signifies board independence and careful scrutiny of management, as opposed to rent-
seeking by insiders.  Id. at 30.  However, it would seem that management would prefer 
not to have a staggered board in such instances.  
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As mentioned, while numerous papers have broadly analyzed cor-
porate takeovers and defenses from a theoretical perspective,103 most 
have not included formal mathematical models.104  Most formal mod-
els of takeover defenses have restricted themselves to narrower aspects 
of the takeover market.105  For example, Professors Andrei Shleifer 
and Robert Vishny presented a model demonstrating how antitakeo-
ver maneuvers may maximize shareholder value.106  Their model also 
illustrates that negative share-price reactions associated with such ma-
neuvers may be attributable to new information that the maneuvers 
reveal about the target, rather than the maneuvers themselves.107  
However, their model, designed to analyze greenmail,108 only applies 
to “action[s] that effectively eliminate[] a potential acquirer.”109  Thus, 
it is not directly translatable to the larger context of takeover defenses, 
such as poison pills, which do not have this effect.110  Professors David 
Austen-Smith and Patricia O’Brien presented a model that explains 
why shareholders may sometimes vote in favor of antitakeover provi-
sions that decrease firm value.111  However, a corporation’s board of 
directors is generally free to adopt a poison pill without any action by 
shareholders, thus limiting this model’s applicability to the modern 
takeover market.112 
More recently, Professor Guhan Subramanian constructed a mod-
el of takeover defenses using the analytic framework of negotiation 
theory.113  He then used this model to illustrate how previous theoreti-
cal discussions’ failure to account for real-world phenomena led them 
 
103 See sources cited supra note 2.  
104 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
105 See sources cited supra note 4. 
106 Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 4, at 297-308. 
107 Id. 
108 Greenmail generally refers to a target corporation buying back a potential ac-
quirer’s shares at a premium in exchange for the potential acquirer agreeing not to 
own any target shares for a period of time.  See id. at 293 (defining greenmail and de-
scribing it as one of the “most prominent example[s] of a managerial action common-
ly believed to be in conflict with shareholders’ interest”). 
109 Id. at 294. 
110 See sources cited supra note 59. 
111 See Austen-Smith & O’Brien, supra note 4, at 212-13 (arguing that, given certain 
signaling effects and other actors’ responses to their actions, shareholders may be 
choosing the “lesser of two declines in value”).  
112 See Coates, supra note 6, at 286-87 (demonstrating the ease with which “large, 
sophisticated targets” can quickly adopt a poison pill). 
113 See Subramanian, supra note 3, at 640-44 (applying a Nash bargaining game to 
explain takeover behavior).  For an explanation of a Nash bargaining game, see John 
F. Nash, Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155, 157-59 (1950). 
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to overstate the value of defenses to target shareholders.114  Subrama-
nian posits that, at best, an acquirer has all of the negotiating leverage 
when there are no defenses, while strong defenses place both parties 
on even footing.115  He argues that, in practice, other factors are likely 
to constrain outcomes, such as other options available to acquirers or 
targets (e.g., selling to or buying another firm),116 the costs of a hostile 
bid,117 and managerial unfaithfulness.118  Subramanian also recognizes 
that target managers often have private information regarding the 
true value of the firm and argues that this militates in favor of friendly 
deals, further reducing the value of defenses.119 
In summary, no formal theoretical model has yet been proposed 
that explains either the observed variation in firms’ defense levels or 
how firms choose those levels.120  This Article attempts to fill both of 
these gaps by offering a theoretical exploration of the effects of mod-
ern takeover defenses that can provide insights into the complicated 
empirical evidence on these defenses.  Our models consider managers’ 
informational advantage in more depth and show how this informa-
tional asymmetry may cause defenses to benefit target shareholders, 
even though managers are unfaithful agents.121  Our models predict 
that poison pills increase target shareholder returns and that, in some 
cases (but not all), the presence of an effective staggered board further 
increases those returns.122  Our models thus offer an explanation for 
the diverse defense levels that corporations exhibit and shed further 
light on the debate over the nature of regulatory competition. 
 
114 Subramanian, supra note 3, at 644-48, 665-66. 
115 Id. at 655-59. 
116 Id. at 644-50.  
117 See id. at 650-59 (arguing that hostile bids affect bidder out-of-pocket costs, 
bidder reputational costs, target costs, and defense-dependent costs).  
118 See id. at 662-65 (explaining how corporate insiders might use leverage created 
by defenses to extract value for themselves instead of for shareholders).  
119 Id. at 659-62. 
120 But see John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses:  Blame the 
Lawyers, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1301, 1383-86 (2001) (“[V]ariation in legal takeover defense 
vulnerability at the IPO stage is explained in large part by variation in the quality of 
legal advice provided to pre-IPO owner-managers.”); Ahn et al., supra note 84, at 36 
(arguing that firms with low monitoring costs and high advisory needs often benefit 
from staggered boards). 
121 See infra Section II.C. 
122 See infra Part III. 
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II.  THE MODELS 
This Article models three different antitakeover regimes.  Each is 
a multi-period model123 built around a core of shared assumptions 
about (1) the target corporation (the “Target”) and (2) the incentives 
of, and the information available to, the Target’s shareholders (the 
“Shareholders”), its managers and board of directors (the managers 
and the board of directors, collectively, the “Insiders”124), and the 
would-be acquirer of the Target (the “Acquirer”).  Section II.A pre-
sents this common core. 
This joint framework is then used to model three separate anti-
takeover regimes for the Target.  Each regime changes the dynamic in 
which the Acquirer’s bid is considered, and each provides a different 
level of protection against takeovers.  In increasing order of protec-
tion, the three regimes are:  (1) the Target has no poison pill, (2) the 
Target has a poison pill but it does not have an effective staggered 
board, and (3) the Target has both a poison pill and an effective stag-
gered board. 
For ease of analysis, regime (1) is modeled in Section II.B (the 
“No Poison Pill” model), regime (3) is modeled in Section II.C (the 
“Poison Pill with ESB” model), and regime (2) is modeled last, in Sec-
tion II.D (the “Poison Pill Without ESB” model).  Section II.E then 
uses the results of the previous Sections’ analyses to build two inte-
grated models:  the “Managerialist” model, in which the Insiders 
choose the Target’s level of antitakeover defenses, and the “Share-
holder Primacy” model, in which the Shareholders choose.  We pro-
ceed to consider the predictions of these two integrated models in 
light of observed real-world behavior and the welfare implications of 
the various antitakeover regimes. 
A.  Common Framework:  Players and Incentives 
This Article’s models begin with the Target, the Shareholders, and 
the Insiders.  The Target has an overall value, v (the “Actual Target 
Value”).  This amount reflects the Target’s assets and liabilities, ex-
 
123 A multi-period model is a model with more than one time period.  See DREW 
FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 70-72 (1991) (providing a mathematical 
and conceptual definition of a “multi-stage game” and equating “stages” of the game to 
time periods). 
124 While managers and board members are grouped together as “Insiders,” these 
groups are not interchangeable and do not have the same incentives.  See infra Section 
II.A. 
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pected future earnings, and other sources of value.125  In the first peri-
od of each model, the Shareholders and the rest of the public at large 
do not observe v directly.  Instead, they know that v is within a range 
of possible values; the lower bound of this distribution is vmin (the 
“Minimum Target Value”) and the upper bound is vmax (the “Maxi-
mum Target Value”).126  The models analyzed in this Article assume 
that v is uniformly distributed over this interval; in other words, v is 
equally likely to be any value in this range.  Accordingly, the public es-
timates the Target’s value to be the midpoint of this range (v̄).127  This 
value—the public’s expectation with respect to the Actual Target Val-
ue, not the Actual Target Value itself—is reflected in the market price 
of the Target’s stock (the “Initial Trading Price”).128     
Consider a fictional company, “AcmeCo.”  Assume AcmeCo has 
assets worth between $250 and $750.129  For example, AcmeCo might 
be a coal mining company with $250 of known and proven coal re-
serves, with additional reserves that have not been fully surveyed but 
which may be worth as much as $500, or a pharmaceutical company 
with approved drugs worth $250 and additional products under de-
velopment that could be worth up to $500 in aggregate.  The Mini-
mum Target Value would thus be $250, and the Maximum Target 
Value would be $750.  The Initial Trading Price would be $500, the 
midpoint between these two values as well as the expected value of 
AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value.130  This Article will refer to this “Ac-
meCo Example” at several points to illustrate other concepts. 
In reality, firm values are unlikely to be uniformly distributed,131 
but, as shown in the Appendix,132 all of the conceptual results present-
 
125 The models assume that v ≥ 0. 
126 It follows from the assumption v ≥ 0 that vmin  ≥ 0 and vmax  ≥ 0.  
127 See DAVID R. ANDERSON ET AL., STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 229 
(rev. 10th ed. 2009) (stating that the expected value of a uniform continuous probabil-
ity distribution is the midpoint between the smallest and largest values that the random 
variable may assume). 
128 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 
70 VA. L. REV. 549, 551 (1984) (“Despite certain anomalies, numerous studies demon-
strate that the capital market responds efficiently to an extraordinary variety of infor-
mation.” (footnote omitted)). 
129 All dollar amounts in the examples are in millions.  
130 Again, the Initial Trading Price and the expected value of AcmeCo’s Actual 
Target Value are the same because the Actual Target Value is assumed to be uniformly 
distributed over this interval.  
131 A more common assumption among sophisticated mathematical analyses is 
that stock prices are distributed lognormally.  See, e.g., Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, 
The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637, 640 (1973) (assum-
ing that stock prices follow a “random walk,” and, thus, that the “distribution of possi-
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ed here hold true when firm values follow any given distribution.  We 
assume a uniform distribution within the main text of this Article to 
capture the point that valuation is uncertain and to simplify the math-
ematical analysis, which makes it easier to understand what is happen-
ing on a conceptual level.  Part III considers the implications of using 
a more realistic probability distribution.133 
The models assume that the Insiders, by virtue of their positions, 
have private information about the Target in the first period.  In the 
case of the coal company referenced above, this could mean knowledge 
of preliminary and unreleased surveys of the unexplored reserves or, in 
the case of the pharmaceutical company, preliminary results from clini-
cal trials.  In other scenarios, this information could include knowledge 
of research and development projects, contract negotiations, or inter-
nal strife at the company.  This assumption—that Insiders often have 
private information that gives them insight into a firm’s value that the 
public does not have—is a basic tenet underlying insider-trading en-
forcement policy,134 and some suggest that it is a primary assumption 
underlying Delaware corporate jurisprudence.135 
Accordingly, our models assume that the Insiders’ private infor-
mation about the Target gives them exact knowledge of the Actual 
Target Value.  So, continuing with our AcmeCo Example, while the 
public knows only that AcmeCo is worth between $250 and $750, the 
Insiders know its exact value.  While this assumption is unlikely to be 
true in reality, the Insiders, of all the parties involved, are likely to 
have the best information about the Target’s value, which is the key 
insight that the models must capture.  The models would work simi-
larly as long as the Insiders have the best information about the Tar-
 
ble stock prices at the end of any finite interval is lognormal”); Mark Rubinstein, The 
Valuation of Uncertain Income Streams and the Pricing of Options, 7 BELL J. ECON. 407, 417-
20 (1976) (deriving the Black-Scholes formula while assuming stock price variables 
were lognormal); Michael J. Sharpe, Lognormal Model for Stock Prices 2 (un-
published manuscript), available at http://math.ucsd.edu/~msharpe/stockgrowth.pdf 
(assuming, for calculation purposes, that the set of stock prices is lognormal).  
132 The Appendix does not assume a uniform distribution. 
133 See infra subsection III.B.3. 
134 PALMITER & PARTNOY, supra note 28, at 833. 
135 See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law:  The Uncertain 
Search for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 521-22 (2002) (arguing that Delaware 
takeover cases reflect the “hidden value” model “in which a firm’s true economic value 
is visible to well-informed corporate directors but not to the company’s shareholders 
or to potential acquirers”); see also Subramanian, supra note 3, at 659-62 (adopting a 
framework resembling the “hidden value” model). 
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get’s value.136  Assuming that the Insiders’ information is exactly accu-
rate is a simplifying assumption that makes the models more tractable 
and helps to highlight the intuitions underlying them.  Part III exam-
ines the consequences of relaxing this assumption.137 
There are a number of processes by which private information is 
disseminated into the markets over time.138  For example, companies 
file new financial statements,139 they introduce (or do not introduce) 
new products, articles appear in the financial press, and so forth.  The 
multi-period models presented in this Article incorporate this feature 
of real-world markets by having the value of the Target be revealed to 
all parties in a subsequent time period, after the Target is either ac-
quired or remains independent. 
The final player is the Acquirer, who makes a cash offer to pur-
chase the Target.140  The total amount of this offer is referred to as the 
“Price,” p.141  The Acquirer is interested in buying the Target because 
some sort of profit will result (the “Synergy”), denoted by s.142 
 
136 It is also important that the Acquirer does not have information about the Tar-
get’s value as a stand-alone firm that the Insiders lack.  For more on such double-
signaling games, see generally Lawrence M. Ausubel et al., Bargaining with Incomplete 
Information, in 3 HANDBOOK OF GAME THEORY WITH ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS 1897 
(Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart eds., 2002). 
137 See infra subsection III.B.2. 
138 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 128, at 592-609 (discussing in depth the 
structure of the information market and its effect on overall market efficiency). 
139 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2006) (requiring that issuers of securities file certain doc-
uments with the Securities and Exchange Commission); Gilson & Kraakman, supra 
note 128, at 635 n.225 (summarizing the major requirements under section 13 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
140 In reality, acquirers offer cash, securities, or a combination.  Each option has 
potential costs and benefits.  Compare Walter J. Mayer & M. Mark Walker, An Empirical 
Analysis of the Choice of Payment Method in Corporate Acquisitions During 1980 to 1990, Q.J. 
BUS. & ECON., Summer 1996, at 48, 48; Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate 
Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 
13 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 188 (1984); and Wickramanayake & Wood, supra note 19, at 7 (all 
suggesting targets prefer cash offers for simplicity or signaling reasons), with David T. 
Brown & Michael D. Ryngaert, The Mode of Acquisition in Takeovers:  Taxes and Asymmetric 
Information, 46 J. FIN. 653, 667 (1991); Dan S. Dhaliwal et al., The Effect of Seller Income 
Taxes on Acquisition Price:  Evidence from Purchases of Taxable and Tax-Exempt Hospitals, J. 
AM. TAX’N ASS’N, Fall 2004, at 1, 19; Merle Erickson, The Effect of Taxes on the Structure of 
Corporate Acquisitions, 36 J. ACCT. RES. 279, 296 (1998); and James W. Wansley et al., Ab-
normal Returns to Acquired Firms by Type of Acquisition and Method of Payment, FIN. MGMT., 
Autumn 1983, at 16, 16 (all suggesting targets prefer stock offers because of their superi-
or tax treatment).  For simplicity, our analysis is restricted to all-cash offers, but stock of-
fers are functionally identical unless taxes are considered, the use of stock conveys new 
information about the Acquirer, or the Shareholders cannot sell the stock upon receipt.   
141 In reality, the Price offered would commonly take the form of a price per share 
of Target stock.  However, the two are generally mathematically equivalent, and con-
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The models assume that the Synergy constitutes a social gain, and 
not merely a distributive gain to the Acquirer.143  While one might be-
lieve, a priori, that acquirers gain utility from takeovers at the expense 
of other parties—such as creditors, workers, customers (in the form of 
market power), or the government (in the form of tax savings)—
empirical studies have generally found that these factors do not ade-
quately explain takeover gains.144  Even if some takeover gains to the 
Acquirer are merely distributive, it suffices for our purposes that there 
be some net social gain (i.e., that distributive effects are not the sole 
source of gains).145 
The Synergy may stem from efficiencies created by the Acquirer 
combining its own business with the Target’s, by the Acquirer running 
the Target’s business more profitably, or some combination of the 
two.  For instance, the Synergy could be created by economies of 
scale,146 network effects,147 or by virtue of the Acquirer and Target be-
 
sidering the purchase price as a lump sum makes the analysis easier to describe.  This 
Article therefore adopts this convention.  
142 The models assume s > 0. 
143 This assumption is irrelevant for the analysis in Sections III.B-D, but is im-
portant to the welfare analysis of subsection III.E.3. 
144 See, e.g., Erik Devos et al., How Do Mergers Create Value?  A Comparison of Taxes, 
Market Power, and Efficiency Improvements as Explanations for Synergies, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 
1179, 1194, 1207-08 (2009) (finding that market power does not explain gains, tax re-
duction explains a small fraction of gains, and most gains are caused by synergy); C. 
Edward Fee & Shawn Thomas, Sources of Gains in Horizontal Mergers:  Evidence from Cus-
tomer, Supplier, and Rival Firms, 74 J. FIN. ECON. 423, 458 (2004) (finding evidence of 
improved efficiency but not of gains from monopoly power); Joel F. Houston et al., 
Where Do Merger Gains Come From?  Bank Mergers from the Perspective of Insiders and Outsid-
ers, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 285, 315-18, 327 (2001) (finding that cost savings, not market pow-
er, explain takeover gains in bank mergers); Gregg A. Jarrell et al., The Market for Corpo-
rate Control:  The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1988, at 49, 56-58 
(concluding that most takeover gains do not come from losses by labor, creditors, or 
tax revenues, but rather from “beneficial reshufflings of productive assets”); Jensen & 
Ruback, supra note 19, at 9 (suggesting that market power does not explain takeover 
gains).  But see Brian E. Becker, Union Rents as a Source of Takeover Gains Among Target 
Shareholders, 49 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 18 (1995) (finding that losses to labor 
caused some takeover gains). 
145 See infra subsection II.E.3.  It is worth noting that the definition of Synergy only 
includes those social gains that accrue to the Acquirer, which may undervalue total so-
cial gains from an acquisition. 
146 See, e.g., HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS:  A MODERN AP-
PROACH 380-86 (8th ed. 2010) (discussing economies of scale). 
147 See, e.g., Jan K. Brueckner & Pablo T. Spiller, Competition and Mergers in Airline 
Networks, 9 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 323, 331 (1991) (describing the operation of network 
effects in the airline industry); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Net-
works of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 772-73 (1995) (discussing network effects in cor-
porate law). 
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ing monopolists of complementary products.148  Continuing with our 
AcmeCo coal mining example, the Acquirer might be a mining com-
pany with a neighboring mine.  By combining AcmeCo’s and the Ac-
quirer’s separate mines into a single, unified operation, they might be 
able to mine coal more efficiently, rendering the whole more valuable 
than the sum of its parts.149  For example, if the mines were worth $200 
more together than apart, the Synergy would be $200. 
The models assume that both the Shareholders and the Acquirer 
are risk neutral and only concerned with their monetary returns.150  
Thus, their only goal is to maximize the expected value of their profits.  
First, consider the incentives facing the Acquirer.  If the Acquirer does 
not purchase the Target, its situation is unchanged; its utility is zero.  If 
the Acquirer successfully acquires the Target, it receives (1) the Actual 
Target Value, since it now owns the Target, plus (2) the Synergy created 
by the acquisition, minus (3) the Price that it paid to acquire the Tar-
get.  Mathematically, this corresponds to v + s – p.  Equivalently, the Ac-
quirer’s utility is the sum of the Synergy (s) and the difference between 
the Actual Target Value (v) and the Price that the Acquirer pays for the 
Target (p).151  The difference between v and p will be negative if the Ac-
tual Target Value is less than the Price the Acquirer pays. 
Returning to the AcmeCo Example, if BuyerCo offers to purchase 
AcmeCo for a Price of $550, and that offer is accepted, BuyerCo’s util-
ity would be the Actual Target Value (which may be anywhere be-
tween $250 and $750), plus the $200 Synergy, minus the $550 Price 
that the Acquirer paid for the Target. Thus, depending on the Actual 
Target Value, the Acquirer’s utility could range from -$100 to $400.152 
The Shareholders’ outcomes are the mirror images of the Acquir-
er’s.  If the Acquirer does not purchase the Target, the Shareholders’ 
 
148 See, e.g., Jordan Barry, When Second Comes First:  Correcting Patent’s Poor Secondary 
Incentives Through an Optional Patent Purchase System, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 585, 601-02 (ex-
plaining how monopolists of complementary products create more inefficiencies than 
a single monopolist would). 
149 See, e.g., Arch Coal Completes Acquisition of Jacobs Ranch, YOUR MINING NEWS (Oct. 
2, 2009), http://www.yourminingnews.com/news_item.php?newsID=39494 (explaining 
that the acquirer’s CEO predicted “substantial operational and financial synergies” 
from integrating adjoining mines).  
150 Risk-neutral actors are concerned only with their expected returns and not the 
returns’ variability. 
151 This follows because mathematically v + s – p = s + (v – p). 
152 The Acquirer’s utility is v + s – p = v – 350.  Because 250 < v < 750, it follows that 
-100 < the Acquirer’s utility < 400. 
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utility is the Actual Target Value (v).153  But if the Acquirer does pur-
chase the Target, the Acquirer pays, and the Shareholders receive, the 
Price (p).  So, continuing the previous paragraph’s example, assume 
BuyerCo offers to acquire AcmeCo at a Price of $550.  The Sharehold-
ers then evaluate whether $550 is more or less than they think AcmeCo 
is worth.  If they conclude that $550 is more than AcmeCo’s Actual Tar-
get Value, they will agree to the sale and receive $550 worth of utility.154  
If they conclude that $550 is less than AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value, 
they will not sell and will receive utility equal to the Actual Target Value, 
which could be anywhere between $250 and $750—the Minimum Tar-
get Value and the Maximum Target Value, respectively. 
Thus, when considering a takeover offer, the Shareholders are on-
ly concerned with two things:  the Price the Acquirer offers and what 
they believe the Actual Target Value to be.  Put another way, the 
Shareholders will accept any offered Price (p) that is higher than they 
expect the Actual Target Value (v) to be.  Similarly, they will reject 
any offered Price (p) that is lower than they expect the Actual Target 
Value (v) to be.155 
The Insiders differ from the Shareholders and the Acquirer in two 
distinct ways.  First, by virtue of their positions, they have private in-
formation about the Actual Target Value.  Thus, while the Acquirer 
calibrates its offer, and the Shareholders evaluate that offer, against 
what they believe the Actual Target Value to be, the Insiders directly 
measure the offer against the Actual Target Value. 
Second, the Insiders have different incentives than the Share-
holders and the Acquirer do.  The Insiders are agents of the Share-
holders156 and usually own Target shares.  Thus, they have some incen-
tive to encourage a deal if the Acquirer offers a purchase price that is 
higher than the Actual Target Value and to resist a deal if the reverse 
is true.  But, at the same time, they are not perfect agents of the 
Shareholders, and they also receive utility by virtue of their employ-
 
153 To simplify the analysis, the models treat the Shareholders as a monolithic 
whole with a shared joint utility, akin to producer or consumer surplus.  Subsection 
III.B.5 discusses the likely consequences of relaxing this assumption.  
154 For technical reasons, the Appendix assumes that the Shareholders accept an 
offer when they are indifferent between accepting and rejecting.  See infra Appendix 
A.1, Proposition 1. 
155 In other words, the Shareholders will accept the Acquirer’s offer to buy the 
Target for p if, and only if, the Shareholders believe that p ≥ v. 
156 See supra Section II.A. 
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ment at the Target.157  If the Target is sold, the Insiders are likely to 
lose their jobs and any concomitant perquisites.158  Therefore, they 
generally will not be as willing to sell the Target as the Shareholders 
will be.  Put another way, the reservation price159 of Shareholders with 
perfect information about the Actual Target Value—that is, the lowest 
Price that such Shareholders would accept for the Target—is less than 
the Insiders’ reservation price.160  The difference between these two 
reservation prices is the Insiders’ “Private Benefits,” b.161  Therefore, 
the Insiders’ utility is either (1) the Actual Target Value (v) if the Tar-
get remains independent or (2) p – b, the difference between the 
Price (p) and their Private Benefits (b), if the Acquirer purchases the 
Target.162 
Conceptually, Private Benefits (b) measure the degree to which 
the Insiders are unfaithful agents of the Shareholders; the larger that 
b is, the less faithful they are.  If the Insiders were perfectly faithful, 
and only cared about the Shareholders’ returns, Private Benefits (b) 
would be zero, and the Insiders would make the same decision as per-
fectly informed Shareholders.  If the Insiders cared only about keep-
ing their jobs and not at all about the Shareholders’ returns, then no 
offer from the Acquirer, no matter how high, would induce them to 
sell, and Private Benefits (b) would be infinite. 
For simplicity, the models assume that the amount of Private Bene-
fits (b) is publicly known.163  This assumption is almost certainly false in 
reality, but it is adopted to simplify the analysis and make the models 
more transparent.164  In reality, Private Benefits are likely to depend, in 
part, on a number of observable factors, including the corporation’s 
 
157 See Subramanian, supra note 3, at 663 (recognizing the divergent interests of 
shareholders and target employees). 
158 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
159 The reservation price is the “minimum price a seller will accept” in auctions 
and the “maximum [price] a buyer will offer.”  RUTHERFORD, supra note 10, at 393. 
160 Cf. Peter H. Eddey & Roger S. Casey, Directors’ Recommendations in Response to 
Takeover Bids:  Do They Act in Their Own Interests?, 14 AUSTL. J. MGMT. 1, 26 (1989) (find-
ing that initial bids rejected by management are significantly lower than subsequent 
bids that they accept). 
161 The models assume 0 ≤ b ≤ ∞. 
162 Like the other actors, the Insiders are assumed to be risk neutral. 
163 In game theory terminology, b is “common knowledge.”  See FUDENBERG & 
TIROLE, supra note 123, at 541 (“An event is common knowledge if players know this 
event, know that other players know this event, and so on ad infinitum.”); see also 
Subramanian, supra note 3, at 643 (assuming common knowledge in his models). 
164 See infra subsection III.B.2 for a discussion of the likely implications of relaxing 
this assumption. 
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governance provisions,165 the presence of activist shareholders,166 wheth-
er the company is managed by family founders,167 the board’s degree of 
independence,168 the amount of stock that the managers own,169 and the 
size of the Insiders’ golden parachutes.170  In addition, the Shareholders 
and potential acquirers may be able to make inferences about the mag-
nitude of the Insiders’ Private Benefits by evaluating how the Insiders 
reacted to previous takeover attempts.  For example, if the Insiders were 
receptive to a prior takeover attempt, but it failed for regulatory rea-
sons,171 that would suggest that the Insiders’ Private Benefits are lower.  
Thus, while the value of Insiders’ Private Benefits (b) is unlikely to be 
known exactly, it is likely that the Target’s Shareholders and potential 
acquirers would have some insight into how faithful the Target’s man-
agement is to shareholder interests. 
With this framework of assumptions in place about the actors, their 
incentives, and their levels of knowledge, we can now consider the vari-
ous takeover defense regimes within which they interact.  We begin by 
considering the scenario in which the Target has no poison pill (the 
“No Poison Pill” model) in Section II.B.  We then consider the scenar-
ios in which the Target has a poison pill but does or does not have an 
effective staggered board in Sections II.C (the “Poison Pill with ESB” 
model) and II.D (the “Poison Pill Without ESB” model), respectively. 
 
165 For example, an independent board of directors would be expected to reduce 
entrenchment and rent-seeking.  Dallas, supra note 14, at 801-04. 
166 See Alon Brav et al., The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov.–
Dec. 2008, at 45, 47-54 (describing how activist shareholders can lead to better corpo-
rate governance and increased firm value). 
167 See Robert Zafft, When Corporate Governance Is a Family Affair, OECD OBSERVER, 
Oct. 2002, at 18, 18-19 (noting that family-run firms do not generally focus on princi-
ples of good corporate governance). 
168 Dallas, supra note 14, at 801-04.  In this context, independence refers to the 
percentage of outside directors on the board and the board’s willingness to exercise 
independent judgment, challenge the managers’ assertions, and accept a takeover of-
fer the managers disfavor.  The degree to which these factors are observable varies.  
169 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 198; see also Hartzell et al., supra note 9, at 57-58 
tbl.7 (finding evidence that takeover resistance does not benefit target shareholders 
when the target CEO owns little target stock).  
170 Golden parachutes are contractual provisions that provide for large payments 
in the event of a takeover and certain other circumstances.  They potentially allow the 
Shareholders to affect the Insiders’ Private Benefits directly.  If the payouts were suffi-
ciently large, the Insiders would have negative private benefits (i.e., they would be will-
ing to sell for a lower price than fully informed shareholders would accept).  In prac-
tice, this seems to happen rarely, if ever. 
171 See, e.g., John M. Broder, F.T.C. Rejects Deal to Join Two Giants of Office Supplies, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1997, at 1 (describing the federal government’s rejection on anti-
trust grounds of a proposed merger of Staples and Office Depot). 
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B.  The No Poison Pill Model 
This antitakeover regime is the simplest.  It reflects a basic tender 
offer scenario in which the Acquirer makes an offer to the Sharehold-
ers, who either accept or reject it.172  The Insiders have essentially no 
role in the process.  Figure 2.1 depicts this process as an extensive 
form game.173 
                                          Figure 2.1 
       
This scenario is very simple to analyze.  The Shareholders, for 
their part, believe that the Target is worth the Initial Trading Price 
(v̄).  The Acquirer’s optimal strategy is to offer to buy the Target at a 
Price (p) that is slightly higher than the Initial Trading Price (v̄).174  
The Shareholders accept this offer, because the Acquirer’s offered 
Price (p) is slightly more than their estimate (v̄) of the Actual Target 
Value.175  The Acquirer’s utility varies depending on the Actual Target 
Value (v), but its expected utility is the Synergy created by the acquisi-
tion (s) minus the amount that the Price (p) exceeds the Initial Trad-
ing Price (v̄).  Since the Acquirer offers a Price (p) that is only slightly 
higher than the Initial Trading Price (v̄), the Acquirer’s expected util-
ity will approximately equal the Synergy (s). 
Returning to our AcmeCo Example, in which AcmeCo’s Initial 
Trading Price (v̄) is $500, BuyerCo might offer a Price of $510.  The 
Shareholders would accept this offer, as doing so would make them 
$10 better off than they would otherwise expect to be. 
 
172 Cf. Subramanian, supra note 3, at 642-43 (adopting a similar assumption). 
173 A game is in extensive form when represented as a multi-player decision tree 
that shows when each player acts and what each player knows when it acts.  FUDENBERG 
& TIROLE, supra note 123, at 67, 77-82. 
174 See infra Appendix A.1, Proposition 1; see also Subramanian, supra note 3, at 643 
(providing a numerical example for a similar situation). 
175 Technically, the equilibrium Price is exactly (v̄).  See infra Appendix A.1, Prop-
osition 1. 
Acquirer Makes  
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Shareholders  
Accept 
Shareholders  
Reject 
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For its part, BuyerCo would own AcmeCo, which has an expected 
value of $500, and gain an additional $200 in Synergy.  In exchange, 
BuyerCo would pay $510 to the Shareholders, leaving it with an ex-
pected net utility of $500 + $200 – $510 = $190.  BuyerCo’s actual net 
utility could be as low as -$60 or as high as $440, depending on Ac-
meCo’s Actual Target Value.  But since BuyerCo is assumed to be risk 
neutral, calculating its expected utility ($190) is sufficient. 
In the No Poison Pill model, the Acquirer always acquires the 
Target.  This leaves the Shareholders better off than they would have 
been without a sale, but only slightly.  The Acquirer, by contrast, does 
significantly better, as it keeps the lion’s share of the Synergy created 
by the purchase. 
The essential intuition behind this model is that the Insiders are 
not a factor.  The Acquirer deals directly with the Shareholders, and 
the two parties have similar information sets.  The market sets the val-
ue of the Target, and the Acquirer pays a slight premium.  This facili-
tates acquisitions, but does not provide the Shareholders with large 
premiums, both of which benefit the Acquirer.  In modern times, at-
tempts to take over publicly traded U.S. firms that lack poison pills are 
rare, because nearly all U.S. public firms operate with shadow poison 
pills at all times.176 
C.  The Poison Pill with an Effective Staggered Board Model 
In this model, the Acquirer makes an offer to the Insiders, who ei-
ther accept or reject it.  This formulation represents the empirical re-
ality, discussed in Section I.C, that it is prohibitively difficult to take 
over a target corporation against the wishes of recalcitrant manage-
ment if the target has a poison pill and an effective staggered board.177  
Since the effective staggered board gives the Insiders the power to 
make or prevent a deal, they determine whether to accept the Acquir-
er’s offer; the Shareholders are essentially nonparticipants.  Figure 2.2 
depicts the entire process as an extensive form game. 
 
 
 
 
176 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
177 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 41, at 904-05 (concluding that poison pill defenses 
are for all practical purposes impregnable so long as incumbent insiders retain board 
control). 
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Figure 2.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
The interaction between the Acquirer and the Insiders differs 
from the dynamic between the Acquirer and the Shareholders dis-
cussed in Section II.B.  Because of their private information, the In-
siders evaluate the Acquirer’s offer against the Actual Target Value, 
not against the Initial Trading Price.  This informational asymmetry 
creates what is known as an “adverse selection” problem.178 
The concept of adverse selection describes circumstances in which 
one party to a transaction cannot directly observe the quality of an 
item at issue, while its counterparty can.  It was first recognized in the 
context of insurance markets, which remain the canonical exam-
ples.179  Consider a company that sells insurance policies against bicy-
cle theft.  Suppose potential purchasers of insurance know whether 
they face higher- or lower-than-average risks of theft (they know 
whether they keep their bike in a garage or on the street, the quality 
of their bicycle lock, etc.), but that the insurance company does not, 
and must charge all individuals the same amount for insurance.180  
Thus, the cost of insurance is the same for all purchasers, but the ex-
pected benefit increases with an individual’s risk. Consequently, the 
higher an individual’s risk level, the more likely she will be to pur-
chase insurance.181  This means that policyholders will not be a repre-
sentative cross section of the target population; there will be a higher 
proportion of high-risk individuals and a lower proportion of low-risk 
 
178 RUTHERFORD, supra note 10, at 7. 
179 See VARIAN, supra note 146, at 722-23 (describing the phenomenon); see also 
Barry, supra note 148, at 629 (discussing a potential adverse-selection problem in the 
context of a proposed government program for disseminating intellectual property). 
180 VARIAN, supra note 146, at 723; see also George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lem-
ons”:  Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 491-93, 499-500 
(1970) (setting out the theory of adverse selection and mechanisms to counter the re-
sulting potential market failure). 
181 VARIAN, supra note 146, at 723. 
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individuals.  From the insurance company’s perspective, this is an ad-
verse selection.182 
The interaction between the Acquirer and the Insiders is similar 
to the interaction between the insurance company and its potential 
customers.  The Acquirer does not know whether the Actual Target 
Value is higher or lower than the Initial Trading Price.  On the other 
hand, the Insiders know the Actual Target Value, and will only accept 
an offer if the Price is at least that amount.  This selects for instances 
in which the Actual Target Value is relatively low.183  Thus, targets that 
are successfully purchased will not be a representative cross section of 
targets, but instead those that are worth less than expected—from the 
acquirer’s perspective, an adverse selection of targets. 
This effect is exacerbated by the Insiders’ Private Benefits; the In-
siders will not only require that the Acquirer offer a Price (p) that 
equals or exceeds the Actual Target Value (v), but will instead require 
the Acquirer to offer a Price (p) that equals or exceeds the sum of the 
Actual Target Value (v) and the Insiders’ Private Benefits (b).184 
This adverse-selection problem significantly disadvantages the Ac-
quirer.  If the Acquirer succeeds in purchasing the Target, it will al-
ways pay more for the Target than it is worth.  The larger the Insiders’ 
Private Benefits, and the more uncertain the Acquirer is about the Ac-
tual Target Value (i.e., the larger the difference between the Maxi-
mum Target Value and the Minimum Target Value), the worse the 
Acquirer’s position becomes.  The one factor working in the Acquir-
er’s favor is that it stands to benefit from Synergies that make the Tar-
get uniquely valuable to it.  Thus, the Acquirer can pay a Price that is 
higher than the Actual Target Value and still be better off than if it 
had not bid for the Target.185 
 
182 Id.  
183 If the Acquirer’s offer is high enough, the Insiders will always accept it, and 
purchased Targets will be a representative cross section.  Similarly, if the Acquirer’s 
offer is low enough, the Insiders will always reject it.  But within this range of values, 
there will be adverse selection.  
184 The Insiders’ decision rule follows from their utility function.  They receive 
utility of p – b from a sale of the Target; if there is no sale, they retain v.  Thus, they fa-
vor a sale if and only if p – b ≥ v.  We assume that, when indifferent, the Insiders accept 
the Acquirer’s offer.  See infra Appendix A.1, Proposition 1. 
185 It can be a bit confusing to talk about the Target’s “Actual Target Value,” as the 
Target is of particular value to the Acquirer, who is willing to pay an amount that exceeds 
the market price because, unlike other market actors, the Acquirer stands to receive syn-
ergistic benefits.  See Nikhil P. Varaiya, Determinants of Premiums in Acquisition Transactions, 
8 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 175, 176 (1987) (considering synergies as a reason for 
acquisition premiums); see also Dean Crawford & Thomas A. Lechner, Takeover Premiums 
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Some numerical examples help clarify these points.  Consider 
again the AcmeCo Example discussed earlier, and assume that the In-
siders have Private Benefits (b) of $100.  Suppose BuyerCo offers a 
Price of $600, the sum of the Initial Trading Price ($500) and the In-
siders’ Private Benefits ($100).  AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value may be 
anywhere from $250 to $750.  The Insiders will only accept BuyerCo’s 
offer if the Actual Target Value is $500 or less; otherwise, BuyerCo’s 
offered price will be less than the sum of the Actual Target Value and 
the Insiders’ Private Benefits.  Accordingly, in those instances in which 
the Insiders accept BuyerCo’s offer, AcmeCo’s expected Actual Target 
Value will not be $500 (its expected Actual Target Value in general), 
but $375 (its expected Actual Target Value given a range of potential 
Actual Target Values between $250 and $500).  BuyerCo can antici-
pate this adverse selection; combined with the $200 in Synergy that 
BuyerCo will gain, BuyerCo’s expected utility from owning AcmeCo 
will be $575.  This amount is less than the $600 Price that BuyerCo 
would pay.  Consequently, at this price, BuyerCo would be better off 
not attempting to buy AcmeCo. 
If, instead, BuyerCo were to offer a Price of $500, the Insiders 
would only accept the offer if AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value were 
$400 or less.186  Compared to the prior example, the Insiders would 
accept BuyerCo’s offer less frequently (30% of the time instead of 
50% of the time187), and in those instances in which BuyerCo success-
fully acquires AcmeCo, AcmeCo’s expected Actual Target Value 
would be lower ($325 instead of $375).188  However, BuyerCo’s lower 
bid compresses the range of possible Actual Target Values for which it 
successfully acquires AcmeCo relative to the prior example.  Reducing 
this uncertainty lessens BuyerCo’s bargaining disadvantage against the 
Insiders.  In the instances in which BuyerCo successfully acquires Ac-
meCo, its expected utility from owning AcmeCo would be $525 (a 
 
and Anticipated Merger Gains in the US Market for Corporate Control, 23 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 
807, 809 (1996) (noting that a bidder’s offer price is a function of both the underlying 
value of the target and the bidder’s potential gains from a takeover); Wickramanayake & 
Wood, supra note 19, at 5 (same).  It might be more precise, but less intuitive, to say the 
Acquirer can pay more for the Target than its stand-alone value.  
186 Again, this example assumes that Private Benefits are $100.  $500 – $100 = 
$400.  
187 If the Actual Target Value is drawn from a uniform distribution with a mini-
mum of $250 and a maximum of $750, the Actual Target Value will be less than or 
equal to $500 fifty percent of the time and less than or equal to $400 thirty percent of 
the time.    
188 Given that the Actual Target Value is less than or equal to $400, the expected 
Actual Target Value would be ½($250 + $400) = $325.   
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$325 expected Actual Target Value plus a $200 Synergy).  In exchange 
for this benefit, BuyerCo would pay $500.189  Thus, unlike the last ex-
ample, BuyerCo is better off than if it had not bid. 
If the Insiders’ Private Benefits (b) are larger than the Synergy (s), 
it is impossible for the Acquirer and the Insiders to strike a mutually 
beneficial deal.190  To illustrate this, return to the AcmeCo Example, 
but assume that the Private Benefits (b) are $300 instead of $100.  The 
Insiders would only agree to sell if BuyerCo offers a Price that is $300 
more than the Actual Target Value.  Because of the Synergy that the 
acquisition creates, BuyerCo’s utility from the acquisition would be 
$200 more than AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value, but less than the addi-
tional $300 that BuyerCo would have to pay to overcome the Insiders’ 
Private Benefits.  Thus, BuyerCo would be better off not bidding for 
AcmeCo than making any bid that the Insiders might accept. 
Assuming that the Synergy (s) is larger than the Insiders’ Private 
Benefits (b),191 it is always possible for the Acquirer to make an offer that 
will make it better off and that the Insiders may be willing to accept.192  
The next question is what offer is optimal for the Acquirer to make.193 
It is helpful to first establish upper and lower bounds on the range 
of potential offers that must be analyzed.  The upper bound on this 
range is the sum of the Maximum Target Value (vmax, which is $750 in 
our recurring AcmeCo Example) and the Insiders’ Private Benefits 
(b).  Since, by definition, the Actual Target Value cannot exceed the 
Maximum Target Value, such an offer would have to be at least as 
much as the sum of the Actual Target Value and the Insiders’ Private 
Benefits.  Thus, offering that Price guarantees the Acquirer that it will 
acquire the Target; bidding more would merely mean overpaying and 
lowering the Acquirer’s net utility.194  Simply put, such an offer would 
already be too good for the Insiders to refuse. 
 
189 In those scenarios in which the Insiders reject BuyerCo’s offer, BuyerCo re-
ceives zero utility, which is what it would have received if it had not bid at all.   
190 See infra Appendix A.2, Proposition 4. 
191 Subsequent analysis in Section II.C assumes this to be the case unless explicitly 
stated otherwise. 
192 The Insiders will sometimes accept an offer that falls between the sum of the 
Minimum Target Value and the Private Benefits and the sum of the Minimum Target 
Value and the Synergy.  When they do, the Acquirer will receive positive utility. 
193 See infra Appendix A.2, Propositions 2-6, for a formal derivation of the Acquir-
er’s optimal offer price. 
194 The Acquirer’s net utility is the difference between the value of what the Ac-
quirer receives and the Price it pays; increasing the Price decreases this amount. 
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On the other hand, the Insiders will reject any offer that is less 
than the sum of the Actual Target Value and the Insiders’ Private 
Benefits.  The Actual Target Value will always exceed the Minimum 
Target Value.195  Thus, if the Acquirer offers a Price that is less than or 
equal to the sum of the Minimum Target Value (vmin) and the Insid-
ers’ Private Benefits (b), its offer will always be refused. 
The utility that the Acquirer receives from offering a given Price 
(p) between these upper and lower bounds depends on the Actual 
Target Value:  if the Price (p) is greater than or equal to the sum of 
the Actual Target Value (v) and the Insiders’ Private Benefits (b), the 
Insiders will accept the Acquirer’s offer and sell the Target.  In that 
case, the Acquirer’s net utility will be the value of what it receives (v + 
s, the sum of the Actual Target Value and the Synergy) minus the 
Price (p) that it pays. Otherwise, the Insiders will reject the Acquirer’s 
offer, and there will be no transaction.  The Acquirer will neither pay 
anything nor take ownership of the Target, and its net utility will 
therefore be zero. 
Consider how the Acquirer’s utility changes when it increases the 
Price that it offers by a small amount, y (i.e., it increases the Price 
from p to p + y).  In all of the instances in which the Insiders would 
have accepted a Price of p, the Acquirer becomes worse off; in both 
scenarios, it purchases the Target, but in the second scenario, the Ac-
quirer pays a higher price.  In all of the instances in which the Insiders 
reject the Acquirer’s new offer, they would also reject the Acquirer’s 
original, slightly lower offer.  Therefore, the Acquirer’s relative posi-
tion in these instances is unchanged.  Lastly, there are some instances 
in which the Insiders would reject the original offer, but will accept 
the new, higher offer.  In these instances, the Acquirer is better off.  
Figure 2.3, below, illustrates these effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
195 Assuming the Actual Target Value (v) follows a uniform distribution, the prob-
ability that the Target is worth exactly the Minimum Target Value is essentially nil.  
ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 127, at 229.  
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Figure 2.3:  Effect of Offering a Price Increase of y on the  
Acquirer’s Utility as a Function of Target Value, v196 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The amount that the Acquirer expects to lose from raising its 
Price when its original Price would have been sufficient appears as the 
lighter shaded region, a parallelogram, with height y and width (p – b) 
– vmin.  At the lower bound of the range of possible Prices (p), this par-
allelogram has no width and the Acquirer’s expected loss from a price 
increase is zero.  As the offered Price (p) increases, so do the Acquir-
er’s expected losses from a further increase. 
The amount that the Acquirer expects to gain from those instanc-
es in which the higher Price would entice the Insiders to sell, but the 
original Price would not, appears as the darker shaded region.  This 
region is trapezoidal, as shown in Figure 2.3.  But, for small increases 
in price, it is effectively a rectangle, with base y and height (s – b).  
These expected gains do not change with the original Price. 
The optimal Price for the Acquirer to offer is the smaller of (1) the 
Price at which the expected costs from increasing the Price equal the 
expected gains from doing so, and (2) the upper bound on the range 
of potential offers, (vmax + b) (an “Upper-Bound Offer”). 
The first offer corresponds to the Price (p) at which the darker and 
lighter shaded regions in Figure 2.3 have the same area.197  Mathemati-
cally, for small values of y, this essentially means that y(p – b – vmin) = y(s 
 
196 Figure 2.3 assumes vmin + b < p < vmax + b. 
197 This is true because of the assumption that the Actual Target Value follows a 
uniform distribution.  The same principle holds for other distributions, but the math is 
more complicated because different possible valuations have different probabilities.  
See infra Appendix A.2, Propositions 2, 6.  
vmin p 
Acquirer’s Utility 
Firm Value 
s – b 
Utility lost 
by Acquirer 
Utility gained 
by Acquirer 
p – b p – b + y vmaxvmin 
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– b).  This is true when p = vmin + s
198 (i.e., when the Price is the sum of 
the Minimum Target Value and the Synergy).199  In such a scenario, 
there will be cases—those instances in which the Actual Target Value is 
high—in which the Insiders will reject the Acquirer’s offer.  Thus, the 
Acquirer will purchase the Target sometimes, but not always.200 
For example, assume again that AcmeCo is worth between $250 and 
$750, and is estimated to be worth $500.  Assume further that the Syn-
ergy is $300 and the Insiders’ Private Benefits are $100.  It is optimal for 
BuyerCo to offer a Price of $550 ($250 + $300).  The Insiders will only 
accept this offer if AcmeCo’s actual value is $450 or less, which will only 
be the case 40% of the time.201  The other 60% of the time, the Insiders 
will reject BuyerCo’s offer and AcmeCo will not be acquired. 
As the Synergy (s) increases and all other variables remain con-
stant, the Acquirer’s optimal offer increases correspondingly,202 as 
does the probability that the Acquirer successfully purchases the Tar-
get.  If the Synergy is sufficiently large, the sum of the Minimum Tar-
get Value (vmin) and the Synergy (s) will exceed the upper bound on 
the offer range established previously.  In such a case, it is optimal for 
the Acquirer to make an Upper-Bound Offer.  As noted previously, 
such a bid ensures that the Acquirer will always purchase the Target. 
To summarize the conclusions of this Section, when the Target 
has a poison pill and an effective staggered board, the Acquirer’s op-
timal behavior will be one of three possibilities.  If the Synergy (s) is 
less than the Insiders’ Private Benefits (b), any offer that the Insiders 
would accept would be worse for the Acquirer than not acquiring the 
Target.  Accordingly, the Acquirer will make an offer that is too low to 
 
198 If y(p – b – vmin) = y(s – b), then p – b – vmin = s – b.  Adding b + vmin to both sides 
of this equation yields p = s + vmin. 
199 Note that the Acquirer is never harmed if the Insiders accept such an offer.  In 
its worst-case scenario, the transaction is a wash—it pays a Price equal to the Minimum 
Target Value plus the Synergy and, in exchange, it receives the Target, which is worth 
the Minimum Target Value, plus the Synergy.  
200 The percentage of successful bids equals the ratio of (1) the Synergy minus the 
Insiders’ Private Benefits to (2) the Maximum Target Value minus the Minimum Target 
Value, or (s – b)/(vmax – vmin).  See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 127, at 227-29; see also 
infra Appendix A.2, Proposition 2 (establishing the Acquirer’s optimal strategy under a 
larger set of conditions).  
201 If AcmeCo’s value is uniformly distributed over the interval between $250 and 
$750, the probability that AcmeCo is worth $450 or less is ($450 – $250)/($750 – $250) 
= $200/$500 = 0.4 = 40%. 
202 Recall that the Acquirer’s optimal Price (p) in this instance is vmin + s.  There-
fore, an increase in the Synergy creates a corresponding increase in the optimal Price.  
See infra Appendix A.2, Proposition 4 (establishing under more general conditions that 
an increase in the Synergy increases the optimal Price). 
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be accepted.203  Alternatively, if the Synergy (s) is more than the Insid-
ers’ Private Benefits (b), the Acquirer’s optimal offer will be the min-
imum of (1) the sum of the Minimum Target Value (vmin) and the 
Synergy (s) and (2) the sum of the Maximum Target Value (vmax) and 
the Insiders’ Private Benefits (b).204  If it is the former, the Target will 
only be acquired some of the time; if it is the latter, the Target will al-
ways be acquired.205 
D.  The Poison Pill Without an Effective Staggered Board Model 
The Poison Pill Without an ESB model has elements of both the 
No Poison Pill model206 and the Poison Pill with ESB model.207  It treats 
the takeover attempt as a two-step process.  In the first step, the Ac-
quirer makes an offer to the Insiders to buy the Target for a particular 
Price.  This corresponds to a would-be acquirer first attempting to ne-
gotiate a “friendly” deal with the target’s officers and directors.208  If 
the Insiders accept, the Acquirer purchases the Target and there is no 
second step. 
If the Insiders reject the Acquirer’s offer, the Acquirer makes the 
same offer directly to the Shareholders, who can either accept or re-
ject it.209  If the Shareholders accept, the Target is acquired; otherwise, 
the Target remains independent.  This second step represents a 
would-be acquirer’s attempt to take control of a target’s board of di-
rectors by waging a proxy fight in conjunction with a tender offer.  If 
the would-be acquirer successfully convinces the target’s shareholders 
to vote for its slate of directors, the new directors will remove the poi-
 
203 See infra Appendix A.2, Proposition 3.  Technically, the model requires the Ac-
quirer to make an offer.  If the Synergy is less than the Insiders’ Private Benefits, the of-
fer described in the text will be too low to ever be accepted, as the sum of the Minimum 
Target Value and the Synergy will be less than the sum of the Minimum Target Value 
and the Insiders’ Private Benefits, which is the lowest Price the Insiders will ever accept.  
Nonetheless, it is analytically helpful to think of these scenarios as distinct cases. 
204 See infra Appendix A.2, Proposition 2. 
205 See infra Appendix A.2, Proposition 2. 
206 See supra Section II.B. 
207 See supra Section II.C. 
208 See Gordon, supra note 2, at 823-24 (discussing how friendly deals are negotiat-
ed in the shadow of hostile takeover attempts and how failed friendly deals can be-
come hostile ones). 
209 See Schwert, supra note 49, at 2600 (arguing that deals often shift between be-
ing hostile and friendly during negotiations).  But see Subramanian, supra note 3, at 
661 n.169 (providing evidence via interviews that friendly and hostile takeovers repre-
sent fundamentally different deal tracks). 
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son pill and clear the way for the takeover of the target corporation.  
Figure 2.4 depicts the entire process as an extensive form game. 
 
Figure 2.4:  Poison Pill, No Effective Staggered Board 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analyzing this model is much easier after analyzing the previous 
two.  The analysis starts with the Insiders.  The Insiders’ incentives are 
essentially the same as in the Poison Pill with ESB model described in 
Section II.C.  Accordingly, their decision rule is the same:  they only 
accept the Acquirer’s offer if the Price is greater than or equal to the 
sum of the Actual Target Value and the Insiders’ Private Benefits.210  
Put another way, if the Insiders favor a particular takeover offer, they 
should accept it.  If they do not, they should reject it; the worst thing 
that may happen in such an event—the Shareholders accepting the 
offer—is the same as what would happen if the Insiders had them-
selves accepted it. 
One of the Acquirer’s options is to make a bid geared toward the 
Insiders (an “Insider-Oriented Offer”), in which it offers to buy the 
Target at a Price (p) equal to the sum of the Minimum Target Value 
(vmin) and the Synergy (s).
211  The Insider-Oriented Offer is exactly the 
 
210 See infra Appendix A.2, Proposition 6. 
211 Note that this amount may be less than the Initial Trading Price.  While, in prac-
tice, takeover transactions almost always involve premiums, this is not always the case.  
Bear Stearns famously agreed to sell itself to J.P. Morgan for $2 per share, less than 10% 
of its market value at the time.  Matthew Goldstein, JPMorgan Buys Bear on the Cheap, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 16, 2008, 7:47 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/ 
print/bwdaily/dnflash/content/mar2008/db20080316_356646.htm; Yalman Onaran, Fed 
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Acquirer Makes  
Offer, p 
Insiders  
Accept 
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Reject 
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same as the Acquirer’s optimal offer under the Poison Pill with ESB 
model and, just as in that model, the Insiders will accept it some of the 
time.212  For reasons discussed below, if the Insider-Oriented Offer is 
rejected by the Insiders, it will also be rejected by the Shareholders.  
Such an offer essentially causes a poison pill with no effective stag-
gered board to yield the same result as a poison pill with an effective 
staggered board:  in both cases, the Acquirer makes the same offer, 
the Insiders react to it the same way, and their decision is final. 
Next, consider what the Acquirer must offer to ensure that the 
Shareholders always accept (a “Shareholder-Oriented Offer”).213  As 
Figure 2.4 illustrates, if the Acquirer’s offer reaches the Shareholders, 
the Insiders have already rejected it.  The Shareholders can therefore 
deduce that the Insiders would prefer that the Target remain inde-
pendent rather than be acquired at the price that the Acquirer is of-
fering.  Recall that, by definition, the Insiders are indifferent between 
accepting and rejecting a takeover offer if the Price (p) is equal to the 
sum of the Actual Target Value (v) and the Insiders’ Private Benefits 
(b).214  Thus, if the Insiders reject the Acquirer’s offer, the Price (p) 
that the Acquirer is offering must be less than the sum of the Actual 
Target Value (v) and the Insiders’ Private Benefits (b)—or, equiva-
lently, the Actual Target Value is larger than the difference between 
the Price (p) and the Insiders’ Private Benefits (b).215  For clarity, we 
define the difference between the Price (p) and the Insiders’ Private 
Benefits (b) as the “Insiders’ Reservation Price.” 
By rejecting the Acquirer’s offer, the Insiders may communicate 
new information to the Shareholders about the Actual Target Value.  
Originally, the Shareholders only knew that the Actual Target Value 
(v) was distributed uniformly between the Minimum Target Value 
(vmin) and the Maximum Target Value (vmax).  Now, in addition to that 
fact, they also know that the Actual Target Value is larger than the In-
siders’ Reservation Price. 
 
Aided Bear Stearns as Firm Faced Chapter 11, Bernanke Says, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 2, 2008), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=21070001&sid=a7coicThgaEE. 
212 See supra Section II.C. 
213 The Shareholder-Oriented Offer may not reach the Shareholders, since the In-
siders will sometimes accept it first.  However, whenever the Insiders reject such an offer, 
the Shareholders will accept it.  It is somewhat akin to a predetermined price at which 
the Shareholders agree to sell, like a “Buy It Now” price that enables a buyer on eBay to 
end an auction by paying a particular preset price.  Buying with the Buy It Now Option, 
EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/how-buy-bin.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2011). 
214 See supra Section II.A. 
215 The inequality p < v + b is equivalent to p – b < v. 
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If the Insiders’ Reservation Price is less than the Minimum Target 
Value (vmin), the Shareholders have not learned anything new and 
cannot update their estimate of the Actual Target Value.  Thus, their 
position and their decision rule are the same as in the No Poison Pill 
model—they accept the offer so long as the Price is greater than the 
Initial Trading Price.216 
On the other hand, if the Insiders’ Reservation Price is larger than 
the Minimum Target Value (vmin), the Shareholders can place a new, 
higher floor on the Actual Target Value.  The Shareholders can up-
date their estimate of the Actual Target Value and thereby make a bet-
ter decision with respect to the Acquirer’s offer.217 
Put another way, the Shareholders now know that the Insiders, 
who have better information than the Shareholders, but a higher res-
ervation price, oppose the Acquirer’s offer.218  If the Insiders’ Private 
Benefits are too large relative to the offered Price and the range of 
possible Actual Target Values, the Insiders will always reject the Ac-
quirer’s offer, regardless of the Actual Target Value.  In that scenario, 
the Insiders’ rejection of the Acquirer’s offer gives the Shareholders 
no new insight, leaving them essentially in the same position as in the 
No Poison Pill model.219  In such a case, the Shareholder-Oriented Of-
fer is essentially the Initial Trading Price. 
However, if the Insiders’ Private Benefits are not so large, the 
Shareholders can adjust their estimate of the Actual Target Value.  
The Shareholders will then know that the Actual Target Value is uni-
formly distributed over a range whose lower bound is the Insiders’ 
Reservation Price and whose upper bound is the Maximum Target 
Value (vmax).
220  Their new estimate of the Actual Target Value will be 
the midpoint of this range.221  The Shareholders’ optimal decision 
rule will then be to accept the Acquirer’s offer if the Price is greater 
than or equal to this amount and reject it otherwise. 
 
216  See supra Section II.B.  Compare infra Appendix A.3, Proposition 7 (providing 
the shareholders’ decision rule in the Poison Pill Without ESB model), with infra Ap-
pendix A.1, Proposition 1 (providing the shareholders’ decision rule in the No Poison 
Pill model). 
217 See infra Appendix A.3, Proposition 7. 
218 Cf. Eddey & Casey, supra note 160, at 2 (“In defending against a bid, directors 
have the opportunity to act in the interests of . . . shareholders, or to act having regard to 
their own personal interests.”). 
219 See supra Section II.B.  
220 An interval subset of a uniform distribution is itself a uniform distribution.  
ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 127, at 227. 
221 See id. at 229. 
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Mathematically, this corresponds to accepting the Acquirer’s offer 
whenever it equals or exceeds the difference between the Maximum 
Target Value (vmax) and the Insiders’ Private Benefits (b).
222  If the 
range of possible Actual Target Values is sufficiently large relative to 
the Insiders’ Private Benefits, the Shareholder-Oriented Offer will be 
this amount.  Because the Acquirer can always acquire a Target that 
has a poison pill but no effective staggered board by offering a Price 
equal to this amount, it will never offer more. 
Like the Upper-Bound Offer in the Poison Pill with ESB model, 
the Shareholder-Oriented Offer defeats the adverse-selection prob-
lem.223  The Shareholder-Oriented Offer is generally more than the 
Acquirer would pay if the Target did not have a poison pill,224 but less 
than the Upper-Bound Offer.225  There are also instances in which the 
Shareholder-Oriented Offer allows the Acquirer to profitably acquire 
the Target even though the Synergy is smaller than the Insiders’ Pri-
vate Benefits,226 which is never the case under the Poison Pill with ESB 
model.227 
We can clarify and illustrate these points with our recurring Ac-
meCo Example, in which AcmeCo is worth between $250 and $750.  
Assume that the Insiders’ Private Benefits are $300 and that, as in Sec-
tion II.B, BuyerCo offers a Price of $510.  Whatever the Actual Target 
Value of AcmeCo is, the Insiders will always reject BuyerCo’s offer; 
even if AcmeCo were merely worth the Minimum Target Value 
($250), BuyerCo’s offer ($510) would be less than the sum of Ac-
meCo’s Actual Target Value ($250) and the Insiders’ Private Benefits 
($300).  BuyerCo’s offer is then presented to the Shareholders.  Since 
the amount of the Insiders’ Private Benefits is publicly known,228 the 
 
222 If the Price equals or exceeds the average of the Maximum Target Value and 
the difference between the Price and the Insiders’ Private Benefits, then p ≥ ½(p – b + 
vmax) ↔ 2p ≥ (p – b + vmax) ↔ p ≥ vmax – b. 
223 For discussion of the adverse-selection problem, see supra notes 178-82 and ac-
companying text. 
224 If the difference between the Maximum Target Value and the Insiders’ Private 
Benefits is less than the Initial Trading Price, the Shareholder-Oriented Offer will be the 
same as the Acquirer’s optimal offer in the No Poison Pill model.  See supra Section II.B. 
225 An Upper-Bound Offer equals the sum of the Maximum Target Value and the 
Insiders’ Private Benefits.  See supra Section II.C.  
226 Suppose AcmeCo is worth between $250 and $750, the Synergy is $100, the In-
siders’ Private Benefits are $200, and AcmeCo has a poison pill but no staggered board.  
The Acquirer’s optimal strategy would be to make the Shareholder-Oriented Offer of 
$550, which gives the Acquirer an expected utility of $50 ($500 + $100 – $550 = $50). 
227 See supra Section II.C; infra Appendix A.2, Proposition 3. 
228 See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
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Shareholders know that the Insiders would have rejected BuyerCo’s 
offer even if AcmeCo were worth the Minimum Target Value ($250).  
Therefore, the Insiders’ action tells the Shareholders nothing new 
about AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value.  The Shareholders only know 
that the Actual Target Value of AcmeCo is evenly distributed between 
the Minimum Target Value ($250) and the Maximum Target Value 
($750).  The Shareholders therefore expect AcmeCo’s Actual Target 
Value to be $500.  The $510 Price that BuyerCo is offering is more 
than this amount, so the Shareholders accept BuyerCo’s offer.229 
Now consider a scenario identical to the previous one except that 
the Insiders’ Private Benefits are only $100.  If the Insiders reject Buy-
erCo’s $510 offer, the Shareholders can deduce that AcmeCo’s Actual 
Target Value is at least $410, the difference between the Price that 
BuyerCo is offering ($510) and the Insiders’ Private Benefits ($100).  
Until the Insiders rejected BuyerCo’s offer, the Shareholders only 
knew that AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value was at least $250.  Initially, 
the Shareholders expected AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value to be the 
Initial Trading Price ($500), which is halfway between the Minimum 
Target Value ($250) and the Maximum Target Value ($750).  Now, 
however, the Shareholders know that AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value is 
between $410 and $750.  Since the Actual Target Value is drawn from 
a uniform distribution over this interval,230 the Shareholders’ new ex-
pectation for AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value will be $580.231  Since 
BuyerCo is only offering a Price of $510, the Shareholders will reject 
BuyerCo’s offer.232 
Finally, suppose that all of the facts of the previous scenario are 
unchanged, except that BuyerCo now offers a Price of $650.  If the In-
siders reject this offer, the Shareholders can deduce that AcmeCo’s 
Actual Target Value is at least $550, the difference between the Price 
that BuyerCo is offering ($650) and the Insiders’ Private Benefits 
($100).  Knowing that AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value is uniformly dis-
tributed between $550 and $750, the Shareholders’ new expectation 
for AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value will be $650.  Since BuyerCo’s of-
 
229 Note that the offered Price ($510) is more than the difference ($450) between 
the Maximum Target Value ($750) and the Private Benefits ($300). 
230 See supra note 220. 
231 The expected value of a uniformly distributed variable is the mean of the dis-
tribution’s endpoints.  ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 127, at 229.  Here, that mean is 
½($410 + $750) = ½($1160) = $580. 
232 Note that the offered Price ($510) is less than the difference ($650) between 
the Maximum Target Value ($750) and the Private Benefits ($100). 
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fered Price is $650, the Shareholders will be indifferent between ac-
cepting and rejecting BuyerCo’s offer and, by assumption, will accept 
it.233  Since the Shareholders will always accept an offer of $650, the 
Acquirer will never make a higher offer.  Under the No Poison Pill 
model, the Acquirer could offer less—$510, for example—and the 
Shareholders would always accept it because it would be more than 
the Initial Trading Price.234  On the other hand, under the Poison Pill 
with ESB model, the Acquirer must make the Upper-Bound Offer of 
$850 to guarantee an acquisition.235 
Either the Insider-Oriented Offer or the Shareholder-Oriented 
Offer can be optimal for the Acquirer,236 depending on the values of 
the parameters in a specific case.237  It is somewhat complicated and 
unintuitive to describe precisely when each strategy dominates.238  In 
general, the Insider-Oriented Offer will be optimal when the differ-
ence between the Maximum Target Value and the Minimum Target 
Value is large, but the Synergy and the Insiders’ Private Benefits are 
 
233 Note that the offered Price ($650) is exactly the difference between the Maxi-
mum Target Value ($750) and the Private Benefits ($100). 
234 See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text. 
235 See supra Section II.C. 
236 Studies suggest that a poison pill, by itself, reduces takeovers little if at all.  See 
sources cited supra note 59.  But see Coates, supra note 6, at 286-97 (critiquing the 
methodologies of such studies).  This could suggest that when the Target has a poison 
pill but no effective staggered board the Acquirer’s optimal strategy will usually be to 
make the Shareholder-Oriented Offer. 
237 For the Acquirer, the expected utility of the Shareholder-Oriented Offer is the 
sum of the expected Actual Target Value and the Synergy minus the amount of the 
Shareholder-Oriented Offer.  Mathematically, this is expressed as v̄ + s – max(v̄ , vmax – b) 
= min(s, s + b – ½(vmax – vmin)).  
Calculating the Acquirer’s expected utility from the Insider-Oriented Offer is more 
complicated.  When the offer is rejected, the Acquirer gets zero utility.  When it is ac-
cepted, the Acquirer’s net utility is the sum of the Actual Target Value and the Synergy, 
minus the Insider-Oriented Offer, which itself is the sum of the Minimum Target Value 
and the Synergy.  This may be expressed mathematically as v + s – (vmin + s) = v – vmin.  
The Actual Target Value, given that the Insiders accept the Insider-Oriented Offer, is 
uniformly distributed from the Minimum Target Value to the sum of the Minimum 
Target Value and the difference between the Synergy and the Insiders’ Private Benefits.  
Accordingly, the expected Actual Target Value, given that the Insider-Oriented Offer is 
accepted, will be the midpoint of this range, vmin + ½(s – b).  Therefore, the Acquirer’s 
expected net utility when the Insider-Oriented Offer is accepted is vmin + ½(s – b) – vmin = 
½(s – b).  The Insider-Oriented Offer is accepted when the sum of the Minimum Target 
Value and the Synergy equals or exceeds the sum of the Actual Target Value and the 
Insiders’ Private Benefits.  The probability of this occurring is (s – b)(vmax  – vmin)
-1 if s ≥ b, 
and is zero otherwise.  Acquirer’s expected utility is thus ½(s – b)2(vmax – vmin)
-1 if s ≥ b, 
and is zero otherwise.  See infra Appendix A.2, Proposition 6 (establishing more general-
ly that Acquirer’s optimal offer may target either the Shareholders or the Insiders).  
238 See infra Appendix A.3, Proposition 7. 
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small,239 and the Shareholder-Oriented Offer will be optimal when the 
reverse is true.240 
It is helpful to illustrate each of these possibilities with a numeri-
cal example.  Returning to our recurring AcmeCo example in which 
AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value is between $250 and $750, assume that 
the Insiders’ Private Benefits are $150 and that the Synergy is $250.  If 
BuyerCo makes the Shareholder-Oriented Offer, it will offer a Price of 
$600.241  Such an offer is always enough to acquire AcmeCo,242 and 
BuyerCo’s expected utility is the sum of AcmeCo’s expected Actual 
Target Value ($500) and the Synergy ($250), minus the Price that 
BuyerCo offers ($600).  The Shareholder-Oriented Offer therefore 
gives BuyerCo an expected utility of $150. 
If BuyerCo makes the Insider-Oriented Offer, it will offer a Price 
of $500.243  The Shareholders will always reject this offer, but the In-
siders will accept it when AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value is less than 
$350.244  On average, this will happen 20% of the time.245  BuyerCo’s 
expected utility when its offer is accepted will be the sum of AcmeCo’s 
expected Actual Target Value when the Insiders accept BuyerCo’s of-
fer ($300)246 and the Synergy ($250), minus the Price BuyerCo offers 
($500).  Thus, BuyerCo’s expected net utility when its offer is accept-
ed is $50.  Since its offer is accepted 20% of the time, its expected net 
utility overall is $10.  As BuyerCo would prefer to have $150 of utility 
over $10 of utility, under this set of facts, the strategy of making a 
Shareholder-Oriented Offer dominates. 
 
239 When this is true, the expected utility from the Shareholder-Oriented Offer, 
min(s, s + b – ½(vmax  – vmin)), is likely to be negative, whereas the utility from the Insid-
er-Oriented Offer, ½(s – b)2(vmax  – vmin)
-1 if s ≥ b and zero otherwise, is never negative.  
See infra Appendix I.C, at Proposition 7. 
240 When s – b < vmax  – vmin, the utility of the Insider-Oriented Offer, ½(s – b)
2(vmax – 
vmin)
-1, will be less than ½(s – b), which is likely to be less than the expected utility of the 
Shareholder-Oriented Offer, min(s, s + b – ½(vmax  – vmin)). 
241 The Shareholder-Oriented Offer is the difference between the Maximum Target 
Value (vmax) and the Insiders’ Private Benefits (b).  Thus, vmax – b = $750 – $150 = $600. 
242 The Insiders will accept such an offer 40% of the time (($600 – $150 – 
$250)/($750 – $250) = $200/$500 = 40%), and the Shareholders will accept it the other 
60% of the time.  
243 The Insider-Oriented Offer is the sum of the Minimum Target Value (vmin) and 
the Synergy (s).  Thus, vmin + s = $250 + $250 = $500. 
244 The difference between the Price (p) and the Insiders’ Private Benefits (b) is 
$350.  If the Insiders know that the Actual Target Value (v) is less than this amount, 
they will accept the offer.  
245 ($500 – $150 – $250)/($750 – $250) = $100/$500 = 20%. 
246 ½($350 + $250) = $300. 
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Now suppose the same facts as above, except that the Insiders’ 
Private Benefits are $30 instead of $150.  To make the Shareholder-
Oriented Offer, BuyerCo must offer a Price of $720.247  Such an offer 
is always enough to acquire AcmeCo,248 and BuyerCo’s expected utility 
is the sum of AcmeCo’s expected Actual Target Value ($500) and the 
Synergy ($250), minus the Price that BuyerCo pays ($720).  BuyerCo’s 
expected net utility is therefore $30. 
Compare this with the outcome when BuyerCo makes the Insider-
Oriented Offer of $500.249  The Shareholders will always reject such an 
offer, but the Insiders will accept it if AcmeCo’s Actual Target Value is 
less than $470, which happens 44% of the time on average.250  When its 
offer is accepted, BuyerCo’s expected utility will be the sum of Ac-
meCo’s expected Actual Target Value, given that the Insiders accepted 
BuyerCo’s offer ($360),251 and the Synergy ($250), minus the Price 
BuyerCo pays ($500).  This gives BuyerCo expected utility of $110 when 
its offer is accepted.  The remaining 56% of the time, BuyerCo’s ex-
pected utility is zero.  Therefore, BuyerCo’s expected utility from mak-
ing the Insider-Oriented Offer is $48.40.  As BuyerCo prefers $48.40 of 
utility to $30 of utility, the Insider-Oriented Offer is optimal. 
E.  The Integrated Model 
We now integrate the three separate models presented in Sections 
II.B-D into a single unified model by including an initial step in which 
the Target’s level of takeover defenses is determined.  As previously 
discussed, a target may quickly adopt a poison pill if its state of incor-
poration allows and it is not otherwise restricted from doing so.252  
Thus, the choice of whether to have a poison pill is best thought of as 
a question of where a corporation chooses to incorporate and the 
content of its corporate charter.  The choice of whether to install an 
effective staggered board generally does not relate to the choice of 
state of incorporation because all states permit staggered boards;253 the 
decision to install an effective staggered board is therefore purely a 
 
247 vmax – b = $750 – $30 = $720. 
248 The Insiders accept such a bid 88% of the time (($720 – $30 – $250)/($750 – 
$250) = $440/$500 = 88%), and the Shareholders will accept it the other 12% of the 
time.  
249 vmin  + s = $250 + $250 = $500. 
250 ($500 – $30 – $250)/($750 – $250) = $220/$500 = 44%. 
251 ½($250 + $470) = $360. 
252 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. 
253 See sources cited supra note 61. 
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question of corporate governance and depends solely on the contents 
of the corporate charter. 
There are competing views on how these decisions are made 
among different legal and corporate governance regimes.  One school 
of thought, shareholder primacy, suggests that the interests of a firm’s 
shareholders motivate its choice of the appropriate level of antitakeover 
defenses.254  Another school of thought, managerialism, holds that the 
interests of managers drive firms’ decisionmaking.255  Figure 2.5 shows 
the integrated Shareholder Primacy model, and Figure 2.6 shows the 
integrated Managerialist model. 
 
Figure 2.5:  Integrated Shareholder Primacy Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
254 See Dodd & Leftwich, supra note 78, at 267 (arguing that managers choose to 
incorporate in the state that allows the corporation to earn the most profits, which is 
what shareholders want); Winter, supra note 77, at 256 (arguing that competition in 
the capital markets will properly incentivize firms choosing among legal regimes). 
255 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 198 (“Managerialism conceives the corporation 
as [a] bureaucratic hierarchy dominated by professional managers.”); Cary, supra note 
77, at 666 (describing modern corporate law as “enabling” managerial independence 
and as having “watered the rights of shareholders . . . down to a thin gruel”). 
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Figure 2.6:  Integrated Managerialist Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before considering these integrated models, however, it is neces-
sary to discuss the different context in which they are situated.  The 
models analyzed above address situations in which there is a single po-
tential Acquirer.  If there are several potential purchasers willing to 
pay similar prices, then the Shareholders may have the opportunity to 
use an auction to raise the eventual purchase price.256  The availability 
of the auction mechanism greatly enhances the Target’s negotiating 
leverage and, accordingly, the premiums that the Shareholders are 
likely to receive.257  Many takeover attempts, including some of the 
most dramatic,258 involve several potential acquirers.259  Thus, it is po-
 
256 See Moeller et al., supra note 24, at 217 (performing a statistical study and con-
cluding that competitive pressure among potential bidders lowers their average returns 
on acquisitions); see also sources cited supra note 72.  
257 See sources cited supra note 72.  But see Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin, 
How Are Firms Sold? 16 (Mar. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=642306 (finding no statistical difference between returns to target 
shareholders from auctions and negotiations with a single bidder). 
258 See, e.g., BURROUGH & HELYAR, supra note 1, at 477-505 (providing a detailed 
narrative of the frenzied takeover of RJR Nabisco). 
259 Some authors have attempted to measure the degree of competition among 
acquirers by looking at the number of bidders publicly attempting to acquire the tar-
get.  See, e.g., Gregor Andrade et al., New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, 15 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 103, 106-07 (2001); Schwert, supra note 49, at 2601, 2630-32; see also Moeller et 
al., supra note 24, at 208, 210 (recognizing that looking at “whether multiple firms 
make a public bid for the same target” is underinclusive, but, if one looks at “it as a 
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tentially problematic to analyze choices of defense levels with the 
models presented above, which do not apply to such situations. 
However, there is a good argument that applying our earlier 
models in this way is appropriate, with some caveats.  When there are 
multiple potential acquirers, federal laws governing takeover attempts 
are likely sufficient to allow auctions to form, regardless of the target’s 
level of defenses.260  Increased defense levels may provide some mar-
ginal benefits in this context, but they are likely to be relatively 
small.261  In the absence of multiple Acquirers, however, our models 
predict that disparate levels of defenses will produce substantial dif-
ferences in expected outcomes.262  Therefore, it is sensible to use these 
models to gain insight into the choice of takeover defense levels, even 
though they only depict a subset of the takeover attempts that a target 
might encounter. 
1.  Shareholder Primacy Approach 
First, consider the Shareholder Primacy model of Figure 2.5.  
Which level of antitakeover defenses maximizes the Shareholders’ ex-
pected utility? 
No Poison Pill Model.  If the Target does not have a poison pill, the 
Target is always acquired at a purchase price that is slightly above the 
Initial Trading Price.  On average, this gives the Shareholders approx-
imately the same utility that they would have received if they had simp-
ly continued to own the Target. 
Poison Pill Without ESB Model.  If the Target has a poison pill but no 
effective staggered board, the Acquirer has two potentially optimal 
strategies:  making the Insider-Oriented Offer or making the Share-
holder-Oriented Offer.  If the Acquirer makes the Insider-Oriented Of-
 
proxy for competition,” it suggests that “competition is rare”).  A more recent study 
looked at bidder involvement in the early stages of the M&A process and found that 
slightly more than half of all takeovers involve multiple bidders.  Boone & Mulherin, 
supra note 257, at 2, 29.  
260 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(a) (2011) (requiring that tender offers remain 
open for at least twenty business days); see also Subramanian, supra note 3, at 630-33 
(discussing laws and regulations that limit bidders’ abilities to launch short-lived offers). 
261 Cf. Subramanian, supra note 3, at 644-45 (pointing out that if a bidder has at-
tractive alternatives and a seller does not, strong legal defenses will be ineffectual in 
helping a seller negotiate an attractive deal). 
262 Cf. id. at 642 (constructing a “stylized takeover negotiation” in which the ac-
quirer and target maintained a “bilateral monopoly” or, in other words, “the only op-
tions for the target [were] a deal with the given acquirer or no deal at all, and the only 
options for the acquirer [were] a deal with the given target or no deal at all”). 
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fer, the Shareholders’ utility will be the Actual Target Value (if the In-
siders reject the offer) or the Insider-Oriented Offer (if the Insiders ac-
cept it).  On average, this amount equals or exceeds the Initial Trading 
Price, which is what they would receive if the Target had no poison pill. 
If the Acquirer makes the Shareholder-Oriented Offer, it will al-
ways be accepted and the Shareholders’ utility will be the Shareholder-
Oriented Offer, which is always at least as much as the Initial Trading 
Price.  Accordingly, a poison pill without an effective staggered board 
always gives the Shareholders at least as much utility as no poison pill 
and, in many instances, it gives them more. 
Poison Pill with ESB Model.  If the Target has both a poison pill and 
an effective staggered board, the Acquirer’s optimal offer is the lesser 
of (1) the sum of the Synergy and the Minimum Target Value and (2) 
the sum of the Maximum Target Value and the Insiders’ Private Bene-
fits (the Upper-Bound Offer).  The former is the same amount as the 
Insider-Oriented Offer discussed above.  The latter represents the 
highest amount of utility that the Shareholders can ever receive under 
any of the models.  Thus, the Shareholders always receive at least as 
much utility as they do when the Target has a poison pill but no effec-
tive staggered board, and the Acquirer makes the Insider-Oriented 
Offer.  Accordingly, a poison pill with an effective staggered board al-
ways gives the Shareholders at least as much utility as no poison pill, 
and often gives them more. 
Therefore, the Shareholders always prefer having a poison pill, 
but may or may not prefer an effective staggered board, depending on 
the circumstances.  Specifying when an effective staggered board is 
optimal is somewhat complicated.  The intuition, however, is that the 
Shareholders must determine how much of a role to give the Insiders 
in the negotiating process.  Giving the Insiders more control over the 
negotiations can benefit the Shareholders by allowing them to take 
advantage of the Insiders’ superior information and higher reserva-
tion price.  At the same time, however, the Insiders’ incentives diverge 
from the Shareholders’, which can cause them to act against the 
Shareholders’ interests.  In the Poison Pill Without ESB model, the 
Shareholders have the ability to overrule the Insiders through the bal-
lot box safety valve if they decide that the Insiders are not acting in ac-
cordance with their interests.263  In the Poison Pill with ESB model, the 
 
263 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 41, at 929 (noting that “the ballot box mechanism 
seems to be a viable mechanism against non-ESB targets” and providing examples of 
successful takeover attempts that used this mechanism). 
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ballot box safety valve is foreclosed,264 and the Insiders largely have a 
free hand. 
It may seem surprising that the Shareholders would ever want to re-
linquish control over the Insiders.  But, because the Insiders are more 
reluctant to sell than the Shareholders are, this may force the Acquirer 
to make a higher offer than it would have to make if the Shareholders 
were controlling the transaction.  Thus, by adopting an effective stag-
gered board, the Shareholders are essentially tying their own hands in 
the hopes that, by giving their negotiators greater power, they will ulti-
mately be able to extract a higher purchase price from the Acquirer.265  
Such measures, in which an actor limits the courses of action available 
to it, are generally referred to as “commitment devices.”266 
A somewhat silly but easily understandable example helps illumi-
nate the concept.  Suppose you have a painting that you wish to sell, 
that you have a low reservation price, and that you know relatively lit-
tle about art.  Suppose further that you have a more knowledgeable 
friend who has a good idea of what the painting is worth and who is 
willing to help you, but who has a higher reservation price. 
One way to structure the negotiating process would be to oversee 
your friend’s negotiations with potential buyers.  If a potential buyer of-
fers a price that you find attractive and that your friend is not willing to 
accept, you can overrule your friend and accept the offer.  This lets you 
limit the agency costs created by the divergence between your incen-
tives and your friend’s.  However, you may end up selling the painting 
for a lower price than your friend might have secured if you had stayed 
out of the negotiation.  This interaction resembles a takeover attempt 
under the Poison Pill Without ESB model.  Instead of jumping into 
 
264 See id. at 927-29 (finding “not a single ballot box victory against the ESB targets” 
within the sample takeovers studied). 
265 See Bugeja & Walter, supra note 19, at 42-43 (finding that “target firms obtain 
higher abnormal returns when target management recommends rejection of the of-
fer”); Graham L. Hubbard, Targeting the Takeover, 39 PROF. ADMIN. 13, 15 (1987) 
(Austl.) (finding that winning tender premiums for firms that initially resist offers are 
significantly greater). 
266 See Werner Raub & Gideon Keren, Hostages as a Commitment Device, 21 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 43, 44 (1993) (analyzing the use of hostages as a commitment device).  
A commitment device may be valuable if it induces other actors to behave in ways that 
benefit the committer.  For example, in the game of “Chicken”—in which two cars drive 
directly at each other at deadly speeds until one driver swerves away—throwing your 
steering wheel out the window is a winning strategy.  Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality 
Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 263 (2010).  Commitment devices may also 
be valuable if they enable a person to act at an early point to control his subsequent ac-
tions.  Perhaps the most famous literary example is Odysseus having himself tied to the 
mast so he could not heed the Sirens’ call.  Bainbridge, supra note 45, at 1-2.  
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the negotiations directly, the Shareholders check the Insiders by sid-
ing with the Acquirer in the proxy fight. 
Another possibility is to stay out of the transaction entirely until 
your friend comes to you with an offer that she thinks you should ac-
cept.  This guarantees that you do not accept a price that is below your 
friend’s reservation price, which is more than you might have gotten if 
you were to accept any offer above your own reservation price.  If the 
painting may be extremely valuable, this might be a good tactic.  The 
risk of this approach is that there may be buyers willing to pay your 
reservation price for the painting, but not your friend’s.  If so, there 
will be no sale, even though there are buyers willing to pay a price you 
would accept.  This scenario corresponds to that of a Target with a 
poison pill and an effective staggered board.  By effectively foreclosing 
a ballot-box revolt, the Shareholders have taken themselves out of the 
process and left their agents to work out a deal. 
The relative benefits of accountability and a commitment device 
depend on the values of the parameters in a given situation.  In gen-
eral, effective staggered boards tend to be optimal for the Sharehold-
ers when the Synergy is very high relative to the Insiders’ Private Bene-
fits and the range of possible Actual Target Values.  If the Synergy is 
large enough, the Shareholders will always prefer for the Target to 
have an effective staggered board.267  Subsection II.E.2 provides exam-
ples that help illustrate these points. 
2.  Managerialist Approach 
Analyzing the Managerialist model of Figure 2.6 is easier after the 
analysis of the Shareholder Primacy model.  That analysis showed that 
the Shareholders always prefer a poison pill, and sometimes prefer an 
effective staggered board.  The Insiders’ utility function is the same as 
the Shareholders’, except that the Insiders receive less utility from 
takeovers.  There is always a takeover when the Target has no poison 
pill,268 which makes not having a poison pill even less attractive to the 
Insiders than to the Shareholders.  Thus, the Insiders always prefer a 
poison pill. 
There is a greater chance of a takeover when the Target has a poi-
son pill but no effective staggered board than when the Target has 
both a poison pill and an effective staggered board.269  Thus, the Insid-
 
267 See infra Appendix B, Proposition 9. 
268 See supra Section II.B. 
269 See supra Sections II.C-D. 
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ers will favor an effective staggered board in more cases than the 
Shareholders,270 but either level of takeover defenses may be optimal 
for the Insiders in a given instance.271  It may seem surprising that the 
Insiders ever prefer to allow the Shareholders to overrule their wishes.  
The intuition behind this result is that, when Private Benefits are small, 
the Insiders’ utility is very similar to the Shareholders’.  In such a case, 
the Insiders may reap a net benefit from the higher Shareholder-
Oriented Offer, even though it leads to some takeovers that the Insid-
ers oppose. 
Some numerical examples help illustrate how different parame-
ters cause Shareholders and Insiders to favor different levels of anti-
takeover defenses. 
Example 1:  Effective Staggered Board Not Optimal for Both.  Assume 
again that AcmeCo is worth between $250 and $750, with an expected 
value of $500.  Assume further that Private Benefits are $50 and the 
Synergy is $250.  If AcmeCo has a poison pill and no effective stag-
gered board, BuyerCo’s optimal strategy is to make the Shareholder-
Oriented Offer of $700.272  This offer is always accepted and results in 
$650 of utility for the Insiders and $700 for the Shareholders. 
If AcmeCo has a poison pill and an effective staggered board, 
BuyerCo’s optimal strategy is to make the Insider-Oriented Offer of 
$500.273  When the Insiders accept this offer, their utility is $450 and 
the Shareholders’ is $500.  When the Insiders reject this offer, the In-
siders’ and the Shareholders’ expected utility is $600.274  BuyerCo’s of-
fer is accepted 40% of the time and rejected 60% of the time.  Accord-
 
270 See infra Appendix B, Proposition 10. 
271 Cf. Mira Ganor, Why Do Managers Dismantle Staggered Boards?, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
149, 187-88 (2008) (examining instances in which managers acted to remove staggered 
boards and finding evidence that unvested options—which are forfeited if the manag-
er is fired but which usually vest immediately in the event of a takeover—influence 
managers’ decisions to destagger boards); Subramanian, supra note 82, at 1872-73 
(finding that state law takeover protections increase incorporations, but that the states 
offering the most protection receive fewer incorporations). 
272 BuyerCo’s expected utility from making the Shareholder-Oriented Offer is 
AcmeCo’s expected Actual Target Value ($500) plus the Synergy ($250) minus the 
amount of the Shareholder-Oriented Offer ($700).  This totals $50.  When the Insider-
Oriented Offer of $500 is accepted, BuyerCo’s expected utility is $100, which is the 
sum of the expected Actual Target Value of AcmeCo, given that the Insiders have ac-
cepted BuyerCo’s offer (½($250 + $450) = $350), and the Synergy ($250) minus the 
amount of the Insider-Oriented Offer ($500).  The Insider-Oriented Offer is accepted 
40% of the time (($450 – $250)/($750 – $250) = $200/$500 = 40%), giving BuyerCo 
$40 expected utility. 
273 vmin + s = $250 + $250 = $500.  See supra Section II.C. 
274 ½($450 + $750) = $600. 
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ingly, the Insiders’ expected utility is $540275 and the Shareholders’ 
expected utility is $560.276  In this instance, the Insiders would prefer 
not to have an effective staggered board (because $650 > $540), and 
neither would the Shareholders (because $700 > $560). 
Example 2:  Effective Staggered Board Optimal for Insiders but Not Share-
holders.  Now suppose the same facts as Example 1, except that Private 
Benefits are $150 instead of $50.  If AcmeCo has a poison pill and no 
effective staggered board, the Shareholder-Oriented Offer remains 
BuyerCo’s best strategy,277 but that offer is now $600 instead of $700.  
This offer is always accepted and results in $450 of utility for the In-
siders and $600 for the Shareholders. 
If AcmeCo has a poison pill and an effective staggered board, 
BuyerCo’s optimal strategy is to make the Insider-Oriented Offer of 
$500.278  When the Insiders accept this offer, their utility is $350 and 
the Shareholders’ utility is $500. When the Insiders reject this offer, 
the Insiders’ and the Shareholders’ expected utility is $550.279  The In-
siders accept BuyerCo’s offer 20% of the time and reject it 80% of the 
time.280  Accordingly, the Insiders’ expected utility is $510281 and the 
Shareholders’ expected utility is $540.282  The Insiders would prefer to 
have an effective staggered board in this instance (because $450 < 
$510), but the Shareholders would prefer not to have one (because 
$600 > $540). 
Example 3:  Effective Staggered Board Optimal for Both.  Example 2’s 
result changes, however, if BuyerCo stands to receive $450 of Synergy 
from acquiring AcmeCo and all other parameters are held constant.  
If AcmeCo has a poison pill but no effective staggered board, the 
 
275 40%($450) = $180.  60%($600) = $360.  $180 + $360 = $540. 
276 40%($500) = $200.  60%($600) = $360.  $200 + $360 = $560. 
277 BuyerCo’s expected utility from making the Shareholder-Oriented Offer is Ac-
meCo’s expected Actual Target Value ($500) plus the Synergy ($250) minus the amount 
of the Shareholder-Oriented Offer ($600).  This totals $150.  Even when the Insider-
Oriented Offer of $500 is accepted, BuyerCo’s expected utility is only $50.  BuyerCo’s 
utility in such an instance would be the sum of the Actual Target Value of AcmeCo and 
the Synergy ($250), minus the amount of the Insider-Oriented Offer ($500).  The ex-
pected Actual Target Value of AcmeCo, given that the Insiders have accepted BuyerCo’s 
$500 offer, is $350 (½($250 + $350) = $300).  $300 + $250 – $500 = $50.  
278 vmin + s = $250 + $250 = $500.  See supra Section II.C. 
279 ½($350 + $750) = $550. 
280 ($350 – $250)/($750 – $250) = $100/$500 = 20%. 
281 20%($350) = $70.  80%($550) = $440.  $70 + $440 = $510. 
282 20%($500) = $100.  80%($550) = $440.  $100 + $440 = $540. 
BARRY & HATFIELD REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2012  7:17 PM 
690 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 633 
Shareholder-Oriented Offer of $600 remains BuyerCo’s best option.283  
As before, this offer is always accepted and results in $450 of utility for 
the Insiders and $600 of utility for the Shareholders. 
If AcmeCo has a poison pill and an effective staggered board, 
BuyerCo’s optimal strategy is to make the Insider-Oriented Offer of 
$700.  When the Insiders accept this offer, their utility is $550 and the 
Shareholders’ utility is $700.  When the Insiders reject this offer, both 
the Insiders and the Shareholders receive expected utility of $650.284  
The Insiders accept BuyerCo’s offer 60% of the time and reject it 40% 
of the time.285  Accordingly, the Insiders’ expected utility is $590286 and 
the Shareholders’ expected utility is $680.287  On these facts, the Insid-
ers prefer to have an effective staggered board (because $590 > $450) 
as do the Shareholders (because $680 > $600). 
3.  Social Welfare Analysis 
After having considered two possible ways in which takeover de-
fense levels may be chosen, the analysis shifts to which takeover de-
fense levels maximize social welfare.  The social welfare function is de-
fined as the sum of the Shareholders’ and Acquirer’s utilities.288  This 
function does not account for distributional concerns between the 
Acquirer and the Shareholders.  This seems sensible, as both the Ac-
quirer and the Target are likely to be large public firms owned by dif-
fuse and diversified shareholders.289 
In the event of a takeover, the Acquirer’s utility will be the sum of 
the Actual Target Value and the Synergy, minus the Price that it pays 
 
283 The analysis resembles that of note 277, supra, except BuyerCo’s utility is in-
creased by $200 when it makes the Shareholder-Oriented Offer and when the Insider-
Oriented Offer is accepted. 
284 ½($550 + $750) = $650. 
285 ($550 – $250)/($750 – $250) = $300/$500 = 60%. 
286 60%($550) = $330.  40%($650) = $260.  $330 + $260 = $590. 
287 60%($700) = $420.  40%($650) = $260.  $420 + $260 = $680. 
288 While the displacement that the Insiders suffer from a takeover of the Target is 
a real social loss, for nearly all public targets, the takeover’s effect on the utility of the 
Acquirer and the Shareholders will likely dwarf its effect on the utility of the Insiders.  
See Daines & Klausner, supra note 71, at 106-10 (evaluating the private benefit hypothe-
sis); Klausner, supra note 84, at 768-69, 774 (discussing the notion that managers may 
“buy” defenses from shareholders and identifying the necessary price as between 1% 
and 5% of the firm’s value).  We therefore disregard it for simplicity.   
289 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 8 (assuming that investors hold “di-
versified portfolios”); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71, at 1167 n.17 (“Both theory 
and evidence suggest that if . . . risks are diversifiable, shareholders will be indifferent 
to them . . . .”). 
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for the Target.  The Shareholders’ utility will be the Price that the Ac-
quirer pays for the Target.  Since our chosen social welfare function 
adds the Acquirer’s and the Shareholders’ utilities, the Price drops 
out of the calculation and social welfare equals the Actual Target Val-
ue plus the Synergy. 
If there is no takeover, the Acquirer’s utility will be zero and the 
Shareholders’ utility will be the Actual Target Value.  Social welfare is 
therefore the Actual Target Value.  Thus, a takeover increases social 
welfare.290 
Accordingly, the socially optimal level of takeover defenses is the 
level that maximizes the number of takeovers.  Given the choice of so-
cial welfare function, this makes intuitive sense.  Successful takeovers 
create social gains by increasing the size of the economic pie by the 
amount of the Synergy.  Other than the Synergy, the elements of the 
social welfare function are either exogenous (the Actual Target Val-
ue) or transfer payments that cancel out (the Price that the Acquirer 
pays and that the Shareholders receive).291 
Therefore, the socially optimal level of takeover defenses is No 
Poison Pill, which always leads to takeovers at small premiums.292  Un-
fortunately, the analyses in subsections II.E.1 and II.E.2 suggest that 
neither the Shareholders nor the Insiders should be expected to 
choose the socially efficient level of takeover defenses. 
III.  FURTHER PREDICTIONS AND EXPANSIONS 
This Part attempts to place these models into further context.  It 
begins by exploring several interesting implications of the models.  It 
then compares these predictions to the findings of empirical studies 
and suggests additional empirical work that could be done to test the 
extent to which these models accurately reflect reality.  Finally, it ad-
dresses several of the models’ simplifying assumptions and the likely 
consequences of relaxing them. 
 
290 Recall the earlier assumption that the Synergy represents a social gain, and not 
merely a distributive one.  See supra text accompanying note 143. 
291 Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 8 (arguing that raising takeover 
premiums does not benefit investors because they are diversified, so any extra returns 
they receive as target shareholders is canceled out by the reduced returns they receive 
as shareholders of acquirers). 
292 Supra Section II.B. 
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A.  Predictions and Implications 
1.  State Competition for Charters and Federalization  
of Corporate Law 
Our models have direct implications for the postulated “race to the 
top” or “race to the bottom” created by state-level control of corporate 
law.  Contrary to prior theory, our models suggest that the proliferation 
of rules making takeovers easier or more difficult may not necessarily 
suggest either a race to the bottom or a race to the top.  Similarly, a 
firm that raises or lowers its takeover defenses is not necessarily re-
sponding to managerial or shareholder interests, respectively.293  Alt-
hough Insiders often prefer a higher level of takeover defenses than 
Shareholders do in our models, Shareholders never choose the lowest 
level of defenses and Insiders do not always choose the highest.294  The 
Shareholders’ and Insiders’ preferences depend on the Target’s par-
ticular characteristics, and there are instances in which both groups 
prefer the same level of defenses.295 
At the same time, our models reinforce the notion that the post-
ulated race to the top is a competition to serve the interests of the 
corporation’s shareholders and not the interests of society as a whole.  
The models predict that a corporation’s shareholders will always pre-
fer to have a poison pill because they enable the shareholders to ex-
tract distributional gains from the Acquirer.296  This is socially ineffi-
cient because it reduces the frequency of socially beneficial takeovers 
and reduces the Acquirer’s incentives to engage in them,297 but this is 
immaterial to the Shareholders, who are self-interested actors con-
cerned with their own utility.  Diversified shareholders would be will-
ing to relinquish their firm’s takeover defenses if other firms (who are 
 
293 Cf. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 71, at 171-74 (arguing that increased 
defenses are always against shareholder interests); Ganor, supra note 271, at 185 (argu-
ing that managers who dismantle staggered boards further shareholder interests); 
Subramanian, supra note 82, at 1801 (contending that states offering the most protec-
tion against takeovers receive fewer incorporations due to shareholder backlash). 
294 See supra subsections II.E.1-2. 
295 See supra subsections II.E.1-2. 
296 See supra Section II.E; see also Daines & Klausner, supra note 71, at 85 (finding 
that in their sample no company at the IPO stage adopted a charter provision prohibit-
ing itself from adopting takeover defenses in the future). 
297 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71, at 1174-75 (arguing that any strategy 
that discourages tender offers reduces welfare to both shareholders and society); see 
also Schwartz, supra note 71, at 230 (summarizing Easterbrook and Fischel’s argument 
that auctions are inefficient). 
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potential acquisition targets for their firm) would do so as well, but 
state-level control does not provide any mechanism that would allow 
for such a bargain.  This suggests that, even if there is a race to the 
top, such a race will not produce socially optimal laws. 
This result potentially offers some support for nationalizing cor-
porate law.  Given the choice between all firms having poison pills and 
no firms having poison pills, diversified shareholders would have in-
centives to choose socially optimal laws.  Thus, one might expect that 
the imposition of a uniform rule would eliminate the poison pill, or at 
least reduce its potency.  On the other hand, nationalizing corporate 
law would remove the interstate competitive pressures that currently 
shape corporate law and which may be expected to produce socially 
optimal laws in those instances in which shareholders’ interests mirror 
those of society.  In addition, many countries with nationalized corpo-
rate law insulate corporations from takeover attempts to a greater de-
gree than U.S. states generally do.298  Thus, state-level control of cor-
porate law may well be the best practical option, even though it falls 
short of the ideal regulatory scheme.299 
2.  Variation in Corporate Takeover Defense Levels 
The question of why public firms display a variety of different levels 
of takeover defenses has been disputed for some time.300  As the con-
ventional argument holds that either a race to the top or a race to the 
bottom would produce uniformity in defense levels, our models pro-
vide one mechanism for resolving what some have seen as a paradox.301 
The models imply that public firms choose varying levels of take-
over defenses based on complicated interactions between multiple pa-
 
298 Cf. William D. Schneper & Mauro F. Guillén, Stakeholder Rights and Corporate 
Governance:  A Cross-National Study of Hostile Takeovers, 49 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 263, 263-64 
(2004) (providing statistics showing that many more takeovers were announced in the 
United States than in other countries). 
299 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 71, at 222 (arguing that competition 
among states, even if imperfect, creates a powerful tendency for states to enact laws that 
benefit investors); ROMANO, supra note 77, at 75 (“Acknowledging that the track record 
of most states in takeover regulation raises serious questions concerning the efficacy of 
state competition does not imply that national regulation of takeovers is the solution to 
an imperfect federal system.”); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Choice and Federal 
Intervention in Corporate Law, 87 VA. L. REV. 961, 973-74 (2001) (concluding that while 
state control is “imperfect,” it is still preferable to federal intervention). 
300 See Daines & Klausner, supra note 71, at 88-89 (discussing competing theoreti-
cal views on the matter). 
301 Cf. Coates, supra note 120, at 1308 (arguing that the variation in defense levels 
is attributable to differences in legal counsel). 
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rameters.302  Both these parameters themselves and the Target’s level 
of takeover defenses affect the likelihood of a takeover and the pre-
mium that the Shareholders expect to receive in such an event.303  Ac-
cordingly, studies that consider the effects of different takeover de-
fenses would be likely to reach conflicting and confusing results be-
because their effects would vary depending on the qualities of the 
Target.  Indeed, the empirical literature on this issue is complex and 
contradictory.304  Both studies that have looked for connections be-
tween particular firm characteristics and defense levels305 and those 
that have examined the effects of defense levels on premiums306 have 
yielded mixed and inconsistent results.307  Studies examining the ef-
fects of adopting takeover defenses on a target’s stock price have been 
similarly patchy;308 even in those that have found significant price reac-
tions, the price effects on individual firms have varied widely.309  These 
models offer a potential explanation for these varied results. 
More specifically, the models predict that corporations with the 
highest expected Synergies should be the most likely to have effective 
staggered boards.  These companies likely include highly technology-
intensive companies and companies with nontraditional businesses.  
There is some recent empirical evidence that supports this prediction.  
For example, companies that are backed by venture capital funds are 
more likely to possess these qualities than the average publicly traded 
company.  Such companies also have a higher incidence of takeover 
defenses at the time of their initial public offering than other corpora-
tions do.310  Defenses also appear more frequently among firms in in-
dustries where takeovers are more common and in which managerial 
performance is easier to observe, and were not correlated with a proxy 
for high managerial private benefits.311  These firms correspond to po-
 
302 See supra subsection II.E.2; infra Appendix. 
303 See supra Sections II.C-E; infra Appendix. 
304 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
305 See sources cited supra note 84. 
306 See sources cited supra note 86. 
307 See Coates, supra note 6, at 291-97, 306-10, 328-36 (providing evidence that pill 
adoptions do not affect bids, that poison pills do not correlate with other firm traits, 
and that certain other antitakeover measures have not been shown to affect bids). 
308 See id. at 318 (“Some [studies] show positive price reactions, some negative; but 
mixed or insignificant results predominate . . . . [Even significant] results are not ro-
bust . . . .”); sources cited supra note 87.  
309 See Coates, supra note 6, at 318-19 (“Even in studies showing negative results, 
positive price reactions are observed in forty to fifty percent of the sample . . . .”). 
310 Daines & Klausner, supra note 71, at 96 tbl.2. 
311 Id. at 103-04, 108-10. 
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tential Targets that are likely to have high Synergy and that are likely to 
have Insiders with low Private Benefits.312  Another study has found that 
staggered boards increase value when firms have higher advisory needs 
(i.e., firms that are large and complex) and low monitoring costs (i.e., 
firms in which it is easier to observe managerial performance).313  Such 
firms seem somewhat more likely than their peers to have large poten-
tial Synergies and to have Insiders with low Private Benefits.314 
3.  Post–Takeover Attempt Performance 
The models presented in this Article can be used to make predic-
tions with respect to the future performance of the Acquirer and Target 
after a takeover attempt.  The models are predicated on the assumption 
that the Acquirer is a self-interested, rational actor.  Consequently, they 
predict that the Acquirer should realize positive expected returns from 
successful takeovers under all levels of defenses.315  However, empirical 
studies have generally found that acquirers’ returns from takeovers are 
either indistinguishable from zero or slightly negative.316  While these 
studies typically do not distinguish between takeover attempts involv-
ing only one acquirer and attempts involving several, these findings 
still suggest that some degree of hubris or “winner’s curse,” which the 
 
312 But see Daines & Klausner, supra note 71, at 102 (rejecting the hypothesis that 
defenses are adopted to create bargaining power).  
313 Ahn et al., supra note 84, at 36. 
314 On the other hand, the measure of monitoring costs is positively correlated 
with research and development and with the relative value of intangible assets, both of 
which might be correlated with large synergy.  Id. at 6. 
315 See supra Sections II.B-D.  If a rational Acquirer received negative returns from 
takeovers, it would not pursue them.  Assuming that the Shareholders choose the Tar-
get’s level of defenses, it is difficult to predict the Acquirer’s relative returns across ac-
quisitions involving different levels of defenses because Targets choosing each level of 
defenses will have different features.  See supra subsection II.E.2. 
316 See, e.g., Babu G. Baradwaj et al., Bidder Returns in Interstate and Intrastate Bank 
Acquisitions, 5 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 261, 266-67 (1992) (finding negative returns); Da-
vid E. Bellamy & Walter M. Lewin, Corporate Takeovers, Method of Payment, and Bidding 
Firms’ Shareholder Returns:  Australian Evidence, 9 ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 137, 146 (1992) 
(finding small positive returns for cash deals and negative returns for share exchange 
offers in Australian takeovers); Robert F. Bruner, Does M&A Pay?  A Survey of Evidence 
for the Decision-Maker, J. APPLIED FIN., Spring–Summer 2002, at 48, 56 (synthesizing data 
from studies from 1971 to 2001 and finding zero returns); Sylvia C. Hudgins & Bruce 
Seifert, Stockholder Returns and International Acquisitions of Financial Firms:  An Emphasis 
on Banking, 10 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 163, 177 (1996) (finding zero returns); Jensen & 
Ruback, supra note 19, at 16 (reviewing the merger literature and finding returns near 
zero); Elias Raad & H.K. Wu, Acquiring Firms’ Stock Returns:  Methods of Payment, Change 
in Leverage, and Management Ownership, 18 J. ECON. & FIN. 13, 25 (1994) (finding posi-
tive returns from cash mergers and negative returns from stock-financed mergers).  
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models in this Article do not capture, may play an important role in 
acquirer behavior.317  Nonetheless, studies that examine the joint ben-
efits of an acquisition to acquirers and target shareholders consistently 
find that takeovers offer significant positive returns.318  Accordingly, all 
of the models’ predictions with respect to the social welfare effects of 
various defenses remain applicable. 
Similarly, the models all assume that the Shareholders are profit-
driven rational actors.  Recall that, in the Poison Pill Without ESB 
model, the Shareholders will sometimes reject the Acquirer’s offer by 
voting against it in a proxy fight based on their beliefs about the Actu-
al Target Value.  If the Shareholders are, in fact, profit-driven rational 
actors, the market value of the Target should, on average, rise above 
the amount of the Acquirer’s rejected offer within a relatively short 
period of time.319  This happens at times in individual cases, but the 
authors of this Article have not been able to locate a study that has 
considered whether a rise in market value following shareholder re-
jection happens systematically.  Studies have shown that the stock 
prices of targets that reject a takeover offer do not, on average, climb 
above the offered price within a reasonable amount of time.320  How-
ever, these results are entirely consistent with the models’ predictions 
when the Insiders control whether the offer is accepted.321 
 
317 See, e.g., Nikhil P. Varaiya & Kenneth R. Ferris, Overpaying in Corporate Takeovers:  
The Winner’s Curse, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May–June 1987, at 64, 64-65 (1987) (explaining 
the winner’s curse phenomenon that affects competitive takeovers and arguing that 
bidders discount their bids to account for the phenomenon). 
318 See, e.g., Bruner, supra note 316, at 51-56 (analyzing three decades’ worth of 
merger studies and finding that takeovers result in a positive economic gain); Devos et 
al., supra note 144, at 1192 (finding joint gains of ten percent in mergers of large in-
dustrial firms); Houston et al., supra note 144, at 303-05 (finding joint gains in bank 
mergers); Hudgins & Seifert, supra note 316, at 177 (finding that targets receive ab-
normal benefits while acquirers roughly break even); Jensen & Ruback, supra note 19, 
at 22 (“[T]argets gain and bidders do not appear to lose . . . .”). 
319 If, on average, this does not occur, rational and self-interested Shareholders 
would improve their utility by accepting the Acquirer’s offer in all such situations.   
320 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Gregg A. Jarrell, Do Targets Gain from Defeating Ten-
der Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277, 283, 289-92 (1984) (citing findings showing that suc-
cessful defenses result in losses for target shareholders); Gilson, A Structural Approach to 
Corporations, supra note 72, at 857-58 (showing that, on average, the shareholders of 
targets that rejected offers received an approximately five percent lower rate of return 
than they would have realized if the offers had been accepted). 
321 See supra Sections II.C-D. 
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4.  Optimal Level of Private Benefits 
These models also have a surprising implication with respect to 
the level of Insiders’ Private Benefits that is optimal for the Share-
holders.  The Insiders’ Private Benefits are what make their interests 
diverge from those of the Shareholders, and it is these divergences 
that create the socially inefficient agency costs that corporate law tries 
to eliminate.322  Accordingly, conventional wisdom suggests that the 
Shareholders’ utility is maximized when there are no Private Benefits 
and decreases monotonically as Private Benefits increase.323 
The models presented herein contradict this conventional wis-
dom, however.  In general, these models predict that the level of In-
siders’ Private Benefits that maximizes Shareholder utility is non-
zero.324  The reason for this divergence from the conventional wisdom 
is that, as discussed earlier, the Insiders’ Private Benefits can function 
as a commitment device for the Shareholders.325  Thus, our models 
suggest that Shareholders should not be expected to police Insiders 
perfectly, even if they had the ability to do so. 
B.  Relaxing Simplifying Assumptions 
The models presented in this paper incorporate several simplify-
ing assumptions to emphasize conceptual points.326  While relaxing 
some of these assumptions reduces the models’ predictive power, 
their validity is not predicated on any of these assumptions.  In fact, 
relaxing certain of these assumptions actually strengthens some of the 
models’ predictions. 
1.  Parameter Independence 
The models presented in this Article do not require that there be 
any direct links between the Target’s level of takeover defenses, the 
Insiders’ Private Benefits, the distribution of possible Actual Target 
Values, and the Synergy.  These assumptions simplify and, in some 
 
322 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 207 (explaining that the separation of owner-
ship and control will sometimes result in some form of self-dealing by directors and that 
“corporate law is best understood as a mechanism for constraining [self-dealing]”); see 
also supra Section II.A. 
323 Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71, at 1175 (arguing that any defenses re-
duce overall shareholder welfare). 
324 See infra Appendix A.2, Proposition 6.  
325 See supra Section II.E.1. 
326 See supra Section II.A. 
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ways, generalize the models.  In reality, however, a number of rela-
tionships might plausibly exist between these items. 
For example, it seems likely that an increase in Private Benefits 
would have a negative effect on a corporation’s value.  High levels of 
Private Benefits likely correspond to the Insiders shirking responsibili-
ties or receiving lavish perks, both of which would reduce the corpora-
tion’s value (i.e., the Actual Target Value).  Similarly, the more the In-
siders shirk their responsibilities or line their own pockets, the more 
the Acquirer may stand to gain (in the form of Synergy) from taking 
over the Target and installing better management.327  On the other 
hand, if the Insiders shirk their responsibilities, they may be less likely 
to endow the Target with other qualities that create Synergy (e.g., new 
technologies, access to new markets, etc.).328  Therefore, the effect of 
Private Benefits on Synergy seems uncertain.  Additionally, the Actual 
Target Value may affect the Synergy.329  For example, a new technolo-
gy could be twice as valuable to a particular acquirer as to anyone else. 
However, none of these relationships directly affects the analysis 
of the No Poison Pill, Poison Pill with ESB, or Poison Pill Without ESB 
models.  In each, the parameters are fixed throughout the time peri-
od at issue, and all parameters except the Actual Target Value are ob-
servable.330  Therefore, there is no theoretical problem with treating 
each of these variables as being determined independently and simply 
 
327 See Larry H.P. Lang et al., Managerial Performance, Tobin’s Q, and the Gains from 
Successful Tender Offers, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 137, 152 (1989) (concluding that targets with 
poor-quality management achieve greater premiums when purchased by high-quality 
acquirers); Henri Servaes, Tobin’s Q and the Gains from Takeovers, 66 J. FIN. 409, 418 
(1991) (same).  
328 See Harry Henderson & Alan Gart, Key Variables Explaining Acquisition Premiums for 
Large Commercial Banks, BANK ACCT. & FIN., Summer 1999, at 29, 31 (finding that targets 
with higher returns on assets receive higher book-value premiums); Peter S. Rose, The 
Impact of Mergers in Banking:  Evidence from a Nationwide Sample of Federally Chartered Banks, 
39 J. ECON. & BUS. 289, 291 (1987) (contending that targets achieving a higher rate of 
return on their common equity and greater operating efficiency than their acquirers in 
the pre-takeover announcement period receive higher premiums); Hany A. Shawky et al., 
Determinants of Bank Merger Premiums, J. ECON. & FIN., Spring 1996, at 117, 126 (finding 
that targets with a high return on assets receive higher premiums). 
329 If the Actual Target Value positively affects the Synergy, this will exacerbate the 
adverse-selection problem that the Acquirer faces in the Poison Pill Without ESB and 
Poison Pill with ESB models.  This makes the Shareholder-Oriented Offer more attrac-
tive to the Acquirer, as it overcomes the exacerbated adverse-selection problem.  There 
are similar implications when the Target has a poison pill and an effective staggered 
board.  
330 It is not problematic that the Actual Target Value is not directly observable; its 
value cannot affect any other parameter, because all other parameters are already 
fixed and observable to all parties.  
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noting that it is likely that when Private Benefits are high that the Ac-
tual Target Value may be low, and the Synergy may be either high or 
low.  Thus, the models’ assumption that these relationships do not ex-
ist is not problematic. 
2.  Invariable and Observable Parameters 
The logic above does not apply if the parameters are not fixed and 
observable.  If either of these requirements is not satisfied, parameter 
interdependence becomes more of a concern.  It is instructive to con-
sider each requirement separately. 
If the parameters are not fixed throughout the period being ana-
lyzed, then changing one of the parameters could affect the others.  
There are several ways in which this could have an impact on the un-
integrated models presented in Sections II.B-D—the Actual Target 
Value and the Synergy likely fluctuate with changing economic condi-
tions, and the Insiders’ Private Benefits may also331—but this issue is 
most likely to affect the integrated models analyzed in Section II.E. 
Since adopting an effective staggered board makes a corporation 
less susceptible to a takeover,332 it seems plausible that the reduced 
disciplining effect of the market for corporate control will cause the 
Insiders to shirk their responsibilities and increase their perks.333  This 
would increase their Private Benefits, which could affect the other pa-
rameters through the mechanisms discussed above.  Thus, a corpora-
tion’s choice of its level of takeover defenses would not simply depend 
upon the parameters specified in the model; the level of takeover de-
 
331 For example, the Insiders may be more supportive of a takeover if economic 
conditions are favorable and thus conducive to them finding comparable employment 
if they lose their jobs after a takeover.  The Insiders’ preferences may also fluctuate 
with personal events in their lives.  
332 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 41, at 928-29 (discussing how an effective stag-
gered board can give a target substantial time to remain independent and explaining 
that no attempt to take control of the board of directors of a target with an effective 
staggered board has been successful). 
333 See Pornsit Jiraporn & Yixin Liu, Capital Structure, Staggered Boards, and Firm Val-
ue, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 49, 53-54 (showing that firms with staggered 
boards tend to choose debt structures that favor management interests over share-
holders’); Klausner, supra note 84, at 762 (arguing that management compensation 
tends to rise more at firms with effective staggered boards than at comparable firms 
without such boards).  On the other hand, without defenses, Insiders may change their 
behavior in ways that may reduce firm value.  Cf. Stout, supra note 2, at 856-61 (arguing 
that insiders at companies without staggered boards may engage in other behaviors to 
discourage takeovers and that these behaviors may be more costly to shareholders than 
existing defenses). 
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fenses chosen would also affect those parameters.  Comparing the im-
plications for each of the parties of different levels of takeover defenses 
would become more difficult, but the net effect would be to make the 
Shareholders less favorably inclined toward takeover defenses and the 
Insiders more so, which would reinforce the analyses of subsections 
II.E.1 and II.E.2. 
If some parameters are related, but are not precisely observable, 
any new information that the parties receive about one parameter also 
gives them new information about others, which may in turn provide 
new information about yet others.334 This concern is particularly 
trenchant because several of the parameters utilized by each model 
are unlikely to be directly observable. 
This is likely to have the largest effect on the Poison Pill Without 
ESB model.  If the Insiders do not directly observe the Actual Target 
Value and the Shareholders do not directly observe the Insiders’ Pri-
vate Benefits, this will reduce (but not eliminate) the Shareholders’ 
ability to draw inferences about the Actual Target Value from the In-
siders’ actions,335 which itself will affect the bids that the Acquirer is 
likely to make.336 
The parties’ inability to directly observe several of the parameters 
increases the uncertainty under which the parties interact.  This likely 
operates to decrease the models’ predictive power.  However, it does 
not seem to change the qualitative nature of their predictions.  For ex-
ample, in the Poison Pill Without ESB model, the Acquirer should still 
 
334 See Coates, supra note 6, at 297-306 (discussing how instituting a poison pill 
sends varied and complicated signals that have different implications for firm value); 
Sudip Datta & Mai Iskandar-Datta, Takeover Defenses and Wealth Effects on Securityholders:  
The Case of Poison Pill Adoptions, 20 J. BANKING & FIN. 1231, 1248-49 (1996) (concluding 
that the value of a company’s bonds drops when it adopts a poison pill, but not the 
value of its equity, largely because of what that action signals about the firm’s man-
agement, plans, and prospects); Strong & Meyer, supra note 86, at 82-84 (discussing 
the signaling effects of poison pills). 
335 Mathematically, the equations become somewhat complex because the Insid-
ers’ action gives insight into the sum of the Actual Target Value and the Insiders’ Pri-
vate Benefits and, as discussed above, the Insiders’ Private Benefits likely affect the Ac-
tual Target Value.  
336 The Acquirer’s optimization problem is even more complex, because it de-
pends upon the Shareholders’ decisionmaking rule.  See supra Section II.D.  In addi-
tion, the instances in which the Shareholders accept the Acquirer’s offer after the In-
siders reject it are unlikely to constitute a representative cross section from the 
distributions of the Insiders’ Private Benefits and the Actual Target Value.  The 
amount of the Insiders’ Private Benefits is likely to affect the Actual Target Value, and 
both may affect the Synergy.  Both the Actual Target Value and the Synergy factor di-
rectly into the Acquirer’s utility function.  See supra Section II.A. 
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have two possible optimal strategies:  one directed toward the Insiders 
and one directed toward the Shareholders.  In short, real-world interac-
tions are likely to be significantly messier than these simplified models. 
3.  Uniform Distribution 
All of the models analyzed in this Article adopt the simplifying as-
sumption that the Actual Target Value is drawn from a uniform distri-
bution.  However, sophisticated financial analyses are far more likely 
to model a public company’s value using a lognormal distribution.337 
A detailed discussion of the properties of the lognormal distribu-
tion is beyond the scope of this Article.338  For our purposes, it suffices 
to say that the relative frequency of values close to the mean is gener-
ally higher for a lognormal distribution than for a uniform distribu-
tion.  Similarly, above a certain point, the lognormal distribution ta-
pers off relatively rapidly.  This likely makes the Insiders’ private 
information less valuable and the adverse-selection problem that the 
Acquirer faces less important.  It also suggests that, in many instances, 
the Insider-Oriented Offer’s probability of success will be more ex-
treme (i.e., closer to zero or one) than it would be if the Actual Target 
Values were uniformly distributed.  Similarly, the Shareholder-
Oriented Offer—the smallest Price at which the Shareholders will 
override the Insiders and vote in favor of a takeover—is likely to be 
smaller, because extremely high Actual Target Values are relatively 
less frequent.339  In sum, the models’ predictive power is likely to de-
crease, but the predictions seem unlikely to change qualitatively. 
4.  Zero Transaction Costs 
An obvious difference between the models presented here and 
the real world is the absence of transaction costs.  In the models, the 
only cost the Acquirer incurs is the Price of a takeover, if there is 
 
337 See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
338 A continuous random variable follows a lognormal distribution if the natural 
logarithm of that variable follows a normal distribution.  Kunio Shimizu & Edwin L. 
Crow, History, Genesis, and Properties, in LOGNORMAL DISTRIBUTIONS:  THEORY AND AP-
PLICATIONS 1, 1 (Edwin L. Crow & Kunio Shimizu  eds., 1988).  A lognormal distribu-
tion is often used when a random variable is the product of many positive independent 
random variables.  Financial returns over successive periods are often assumed to be 
independently distributed random variables.  
339 This is because the relative probability of high-value outliers in the Actual Tar-
get Value in the lognormal distribution is likely (but not always) smaller than in a uni-
form distribution.  This makes the Shareholders more likely to accept a lower offer.  
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one.340  Meanwhile, the Target, the Insiders, and the Shareholders in-
cur no costs whatsoever in connection with the possible takeover.341 
In reality, this is not the case.  Acquirers and targets spend mil-
lions pursuing and resisting takeover attempts.342  They retain law 
firms, accounting firms, investment banks, and other expensive advi-
sors.343  They incur many of these costs regardless of whether the take-
over attempt ultimately succeeds.344  In addition, takeover attempts ab-
sorb a great deal of the time and energy of executives on both sides of 
the transaction, which also entails costs, including opportunity costs.345  
Takeover costs are likely to increase with the level of the Target’s 
takeover defenses.346 
The effects of these costs are twofold.  First, they reduce Acquirers’ 
willingness to make bids, particularly bids with a low probability of suc-
cess.347  Second, by reducing the gains to the Target, they reduce the 
 
340 See supra Section II.A. 
341 See supra Section II.A. 
342 See, e.g., Mark Scott, BHP Billiton Ends Rio Tinto Takeover Battle, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 25, 2008), http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/blog/europe 
insight/archives/2008/11/bhp_billiton_ends_rio_tinto_takeover_battle.html (noting that 
BHP Billiton spent over $450 million in its failed takeover attempt of rival mining 
company Rio Tinto).  
343 See, e.g., David Lat, When $1,000 an Hour Is Not Enough, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, 
at 6 (discussing the use of “premium billing,” the charging of a premium over hourly 
billings, by law firms specializing in mergers and acquisitions).  The costs of takeovers 
are significant enough that they have attracted the attention of the IRS.  See INDOPCO, 
Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 88-90 (1992) (holding that expenses incurred in a friendly 
takeover, such as legal and investment banking fees, are not deductible as “ordinary 
and necessary” business expenses); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2005-21-032 (Feb. 11, 2005) 
(ruling that expenses incurred to terminate a merger so that a corporation could enter 
into a different merger could not be deducted as “ordinary and necessary” business 
expenses); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-27-005 (Mar. 27, 1989) (determining that ex-
penses incurred in procuring a white knight to defend against a hostile takeover could 
be deducted as “ordinary and necessary” business expenses), vacated, I.R.S. Tech. Adv. 
Mem. 89-45-003 (Aug. 1, 1989). 
344 See supra note 342.  
345 See Subramanian, supra note 3, at 646 (explaining that “acquisitions generally 
require substantial managerial time and effort” and that “managerial attention can on-
ly be focused on one acquisition at a time”). 
346 See id. at 655-59. 
347 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 6-7 (arguing that the inability of ac-
quirers to appropriate the full value of costs incurred when searching for potential tar-
gets will lead to a reduction in the number of tender offers); Easterbrook & Fischel, 
supra note 71, at 1178-79 (explaining that information costs incurred by acquirers to 
research targets may reduce the number of tender offers).  Takeover costs may also 
cause Acquirers to make either higher or lower bids than they would otherwise; the 
increased relative cost of a failed bid favors higher bids, but the reduced gains from a 
successful takeover favor lower bids.  
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Shareholders’ net benefits from takeovers and takeover defenses, while 
increasing the Insiders’ aversion to takeovers and their affinity for take-
over defenses.  This causes the Shareholders to prefer a lower level of 
takeover defenses, and the Insiders to prefer a higher level of defenses, 
than each would in the absence of transaction costs.  This would rein-
force the analyses of subsections II.E.1 and II.E.2 with respect to Share-
holders’ and Insiders’ relative preferences regarding takeover defense 
levels.  But, while the absolute size of transaction costs is substantial, 
their relative size compared to the value of the publicly traded Target is 
likely to be fairly insignificant in many instances.348  Thus, the effects of 
transaction costs may be minimal at best.349 
5.  Shareholder Uniformity 
The models treat the Shareholders as a unified whole, with solely 
profit-oriented incentives.  Both of these assumptions are potentially 
problematic. 
First, certain Shareholders may hold Target shares for reasons 
other than profit.  For example, an employee benefit plan may hold 
Target shares, and it may oppose a takeover anticipated to result in 
layoffs.350  If the Target is in a “green” business, environmentalists may 
purchase its stock partly to support its efforts.351  To the extent that the 
Shareholders are not profit-driven and oppose a takeover, this Arti-
cle’s models will not be good predictors of the Shareholders’ or the 
Acquirer’s behavior.  However, this concern is unlikely to apply to 
most takeovers, since most shares in U.S. public corporations are 
owned by investors whose primary motivation is profit. 
Second, even strictly profit-driven Shareholders are not a homoge-
nous group, but rather an amalgamation of separate actors with differ-
ent valuations of the Target.  As the Shareholders have all chosen to use 
their scarce investment dollars to purchase and hold Target shares, 
 
348 See, e.g., Scott, supra note 342 (noting that the price BHP offered for Rio Tinto 
fluctuated between $150 billion and $62 billion during its takeover attempt, which im-
plies that the $450 million in costs that BHP incurred in its attempt constituted, at 
most, between 0.3% and 0.7% of the amount of the necessary bid).  
349 Cf. supra note 59 (citing research finding that poison pills have little to no ef-
fect on the likelihood of a takeover occurring). 
350 See E. Richard Brownlee II & Robert F. Bruner, The Leveraged ESOP as a Takeover 
Defense:  The Case of Polaroid Corporation, 1 J. M&A ANALYSIS 3, 7-15 (1990) (giving an ex-
ample of a firm that arguably beat back a takeover attempt through the use of an em-
ployee benefit plan). 
351 See, e.g., GREEN CHIP STOCKS, http://www.greenchipstocks.com (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2011) (tracking investment opportunities in the alternative-energy sector). 
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the mean of their valuations is likely higher than the general public’s 
estimate of the Actual Target Value.352 
Thus, in order to convince a majority of Shareholders to sell their 
Target shares, the Acquirer would have to offer a Price that is signifi-
cantly above the Initial Trading Price.  This would lead to higher 
premiums from tender offers in the absence of a poison pill than the 
No Poison Pill model predicts.  Average takeover premiums from ten-
der offers before the growth of the poison pill were significantly above 
this level.353 
However, the net effect of the Shareholders being a non-uniform 
group with diverse beliefs as to the Target’s value generally does not 
change the underlying dynamics of this Article’s models.  This effect 
applies across all of the models to raise the Price that the Acquirer 
must offer in any bid targeted toward the Shareholders.  This reduces, 
but does not eliminate, the gap between such a bid and one targeted 
at the Insiders. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article attempts to fill an important gap in the academic lit-
erature on takeover defenses by introducing formal models of several 
different target defense levels that incorporate target insiders’ private 
information and imperfect incentives.  Through analysis of these 
models, this Article offers new insight into the forces that drive the 
adoption of takeover defenses and provides additional perspectives on 
confusing and conflicting empirical findings. 
These models suggest that a corporation’s optimal level of defenses 
depends on several factors, and that variations in these factors may 
explain the diverse levels of takeover defenses observed in practice.  In 
general, corporations for which an acquirer is likely to pay the highest 
premiums are likely to implement stronger takeover defenses.  And, 
while corporate insiders generally prefer a higher level of defenses 
than shareholders do, shareholders do not prefer the lowest level of 
defenses and insiders do not always prefer the highest.  The level of 
 
352 Though, of course, some may continue to hold their stock for tax purposes or 
other reasons, and not because of a belief that Target is undervalued.  
353 See Douglas V. Austin, The Financial Management of Tender Offer Takeovers, FIN. 
MGMT., Spring 1974, at 37, 40 (finding premiums between five and thirty-five percent 
in most tender offers made from 1968 to 1972).  Since many tender offers are only op-
erative if a majority of outstanding shares are tendered, shareholders with higher valu-
ations of a target implicitly function as somewhat of a commitment device for those 
with lower valuations.  See supra note 266 and accompanying text.  
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takeover defenses preferred by each varies depending upon the cir-
cumstances.  Therefore, the diversity of defense levels that corpora-
tions exhibit poses no challenge either to theories that shareholders 
control choices of defense levels or to theories that managers control 
such choices. 
The models also suggest that modern defenses enable target share-
holders to extract value from acquirers by empowering corporate insid-
ers.  Even though the insiders are unfaithful agents, their informational 
advantage and higher reservation price can ultimately redound to the 
shareholders’ benefit.  However, this benefit to shareholders does not 
benefit society. This result has implications for the optimal degree of 
federal involvement in corporate law, as a race to the top by states to 
serve shareholder interests would still not create socially optimal corpo-
rate laws.  Further research is necessary to assess the degree to which 
these models accurately reflect real-world behavior and to measure the 
relative importance of the forces captured in these models compared to 
other phenomena. 
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APPENDIX 
In this Appendix, we formally state our models and prove the re-
sults stated in the text. 
A.  The Models 
The models are composed of three agents: the Shareholders, the 
Acquirer, and the Insiders. 
The value of the target firm (the “Target”) is v, which is distribut-
ed according to the cumulative distribution function F with a smooth 
partial distribution function f on [vmin, vmax].  Let v̄ be the mean of the 
distribution.  The true value of the Target v is known by the Insiders 
but is not known by the Shareholders or the Acquirer. 
If the Target is bought at a price p, then the Acquirer receives v + s 
– p, where s ≥ 0 is the Synergy that the Acquirer has with the Target and 
p is the price paid; otherwise the Acquirer receives 0.  If the Target is 
bought, the Shareholders obtain p, and receive v otherwise.  Finally, the 
Insiders, whose Private Benefits are represented by b, obtain p – b 
when the Target is sold and v when the Target is not sold.  We assume 
that b > 0.  That is, the Insiders strictly prefer not to sell the Target 
when the price offered is equal to the value of the Target. 
We consider three models in the subsections below.  The solution 
concept is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.  We refer to an equilibri-
um that is unique, except over a set of realizations of the random varia-
ble v with a measure of zero, as a generically unique subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium.  We also make several statements that describe how a 
set changes in response to a parameter.  In this case, a set A(t) is weakly 
increasing in t if min A(t) ≤ min A(t') and max A(t) ≤ max A(t') for all 
t < t'.   
1.  The No Poison Pill Model 
In this model, the game proceeds as follows: 
1. The Acquirer makes an offer p. 
2. The Shareholders decide to accept or reject. 
3. Payoffs are realized. 
 It is clear that in the second stage the Shareholders strictly prefer to 
sell for any p > v̄, strictly prefer not to sell for any p < v̄, and are indif-
ferent at p = v̄.  Hence, we have the following result: 
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Proposition 1.  The unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the 
No Poison Pill game is for the Acquirer to offer v̄ to the Shareholders 
and for the Shareholders to accept. 
2.  The Poison Pill with an Effective Staggered Board Model 
In this model, the game proceeds as follows: 
1. The Acquirer makes an offer p. 
2. The Insiders decide to accept or reject. 
3. Payoffs are realized. 
It is clear that in the second stage the Insiders will strictly prefer to 
sell for any p – b > v and will strictly prefer not to sell for any p – b < v.  
Hence, the problem of the Acquirer in the first stage is to solve 
 
    argmax
min min
. 
Proposition 2.  In any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the poison 
pill and effective staggered board game, the Acquirer offers p*  P* 
and the Insiders accept if p* > v + b and reject if p* < v + b. 
 
Proposition 3.  If s > b, then every p*  P* is interior to [vmin + b, ∞), and 
the set of optimal offers are solutions to 
(s – b)f(p* – b) – F(p* – b) = 0. 
If furthermore f is a weakly decreasing function on its domain, then 
there is a unique solution to the above equation and a generically 
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 
The proposition follows from the second-order condition of the 
Acquirer’s problem, that (s – b)f'(p – b) – f(p) ≤ 0, which holds for all p 
if f is a weakly decreasing function.  Furthermore, if s > b, then b + vmin is 
clearly nonoptimal, as it provides exactly zero utility in expectation, 
whereas b + vmin + (s/2) provides strictly positive utility in expectation.  
For a uniform distribution, for example, the optimal offer is s + vmin if s 
≥ b.  For an exponential distribution with parameter λ, we have that f(v) 
= λe-λv  on [0, ∞], and so the optimal offer by the Acquirer is given by 
(s – b)λe-λ(p* - b) – (1 – e-λ(p* - b)) = 0 
-λ(p* – b) = ln(1/(λ(s – b) + 1)) 
p* = (1/λ)ln(λ(s – b) + 1) + b 
if s ≥ b. 
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Given the first-order condition in the above proposition, it is easy 
to show two properties of the solution.  First, since 
 
min
0 
we have by Topkis’s theorem the following results. 
 
Proposition 4.  In the poison pill and effective staggered board game, 
the set of the Acquirer’s optimal offers P* is weakly increasing in the 
Synergy s. 
 
Further, if s < b, then the first-order condition is always negative, and 
so we have the following. 
 
Proposition 5.  In the poison pill and effective staggered board game, if 
s < b, it is optimal for the Acquirer to make an offer that will never be 
accepted. 
 
Finally, we can take the cross-partial with respect to b and p to ob-
tain 
 
min
′  
 
which is nonnegative if f is decreasing and s > b, and so (again by 
Topkis’s theorem) in this case the optimal offer will be increasing with b. 
 
Proposition 6.  In the poison pill and effective staggered board game, if 
f is a weakly decreasing function and s > b, then the unique optimal 
offer p* by the Acquirer is weakly increasing in the private benefits b. 
 
We also have that, from the perspective of the Shareholders, the 
optimal value of b may be nonzero.  This is because b has two effects.  
First, for a fixed price offering, a larger b increases the range of Target 
values for which the Insiders choose to not sell the Target even though 
the Shareholders would wish for them to do so.  However, as shown 
above, a larger b may also cause the Acquirer to offer a higher price. 
Consider the case when f(v) = e-v on [0, ∞].  Then, from the calcu-
lations above, the Acquirer’s optimal offer is given by p* = ln(1 + s – b) 
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+ b.  Hence, for a given Synergy s, the payoff to the Shareholders is 
given by 
 
∞
 
 
 
ln 1 . 
 
At b = 0, the derivative of this expression is positive with respect to b, 
which shows that, from the perspective of the Shareholders, the opti-
mal private benefits are higher than zero.  Indeed, one can solve for 
the optimal benefits from the perspective of the Shareholders, and 
obtain 
 
1 2 √1 4
2
0. 
3.  The Poison Pill Without an Effective Staggered Board Model 
In this model, the game proceeds as follows: 
1. The Acquirer makes an offer p. 
2. The Insiders choose to accept or reject. 
3. If the Insiders reject, the Shareholders choose whether 
or not to overrule the Insiders and accept the offer. 
4. Payoffs are realized. 
Let us first consider the subgame after the Acquirer has offered p.  
Note that, for the Insiders, it is a weakly dominant strategy to accept 
any offer p > v + b and reject any offer p < v + b.  If the Insiders employ 
such a strategy, then it is strictly optimal for the Shareholders to reject 
whenever the Insiders reject and v~(p) > p, where v~(p) is the expected 
value of the Target, conditional upon the Insiders playing a weakly 
dominant strategy and rejecting the Acquirer’s offer of p, given by 
 
1
. 
Thus, if v~(p) > p, the generically unique weakly undominated Nash 
equilibrium of the subgame is for the Insiders to reject the offer if p < 
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v + b, and to accept it otherwise, and for the Shareholders to support 
their decision. 
Consider p̂  defined by  
 
̂ min  0,∞ : . 
At this price, even if the Insiders suggest rejection, the expected value 
of the Target is weakly less than the offered price.  Hence, in any 
weakly undominated subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the Share-
holders will overrule the Insiders and accept the offer. 
The existence of a price p̂  at which the Shareholders will always 
accept the offer means that the Acquirer can now offer the price p̂  and 
obtain the Target with certainty.  Hence, the Acquirer will either offer 
a price p*  P* and obtain the Target only if the Insiders agree, or the 
price p̂  and obtain the Target for sure. 
 
Proposition 7.  In any weakly undominated subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium of the poison pill with no effective staggered board game, the 
Acquirer either 
 offers the price p̂  , which is then accepted by the Shareholders if 
rejected by the Insiders, or 
 offers p*  P*, which the Insiders accept if p* > v + b and reject 
if p* < v + b, with the Shareholders supporting the decision of 
the Insiders. In this case, p* < p̂  . 
 
We will call the Acquirer strategy elucidated in the first bullet 
point the Shareholder-Oriented strategy and the Acquirer strategy 
elucidated in the second bullet point the Insider-Oriented strategy. 
It follows from this proposition that an increase in Synergy can on-
ly increase the price p that the Acquirer offers for the Target.  Clearly, 
as Synergy increases, if the Shareholders and the Insiders continue to 
use the same strategies, the price offered by the Acquirer will either 
stay the same or increase (as in Proposition 3).  Since p* < p̂  , if the 
Acquirer switches from the Insider-Oriented strategy to the Share-
holder-Oriented strategy, the price will also increase.  Finally, it is clear 
that the Acquirer will never switch from the Shareholder-Oriented 
strategy to the Insider-Oriented strategy as s increases.  This is because 
the value the Acquirer obtains from employing the Shareholder-
Oriented strategy increases one-to-one with the Synergy, but only in-
creases at the rate F(p* – b) with respect to the Insider-Oriented strat-
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egy.  To see this, note that the Insider-Oriented strategy gives the Ac-
quirer expected value equal to 
 
 
and so, by the envelope theorem, the derivative of this with respect to 
s is simply 
 
1. 
Proposition 8.  The set of optimal offers by the Acquirer is weakly in-
creasing in the Synergy s.  In particular, if the Acquirer chooses the 
Shareholder-Oriented strategy for a Synergy level s, it will also choose 
the Shareholder-Oriented strategy for any Synergy greater than s. 
B.  Optimal Level of Takeover Defenses 
Shareholder preferences for defense levels depend on parame-
ters.  For instance, consider the case where the value of the Target is 
uniformly distributed between 250 and 750, and the Private Benefits 
are 100.  If the Synergy is 300, then the Shareholders prefer not to 
have an effective staggered board, as they obtain an expected utility of 
650 without an effective staggered board and 580 with an effective 
staggered board, while if the Synergy is 500, then the Shareholders 
still obtain an expected utility of 650 without the effective staggered 
board (as the Acquirer still always buys the Target) but now obtain 
740 with the effective staggered board. 
However, we can easily characterize some of the instances in 
which the Shareholders prefer an effective staggered board.  In par-
ticular, when s is sufficiently large, the enhanced bargaining power of 
the effective staggered board is helpful for the Shareholders. 
 
Proposition 9.  There exists an s- such that for all s > s-, the Shareholders 
prefer to have an effective staggered board. 
The logic of the proposition is straightforward.  Suppose that the 
Shareholders do prefer an effective staggered board for a given s, and 
consider a given s. > s.  Then, since the Shareholders strictly prefer the 
effective staggered board for the Synergy s, the Acquirer would choose 
the Shareholder-Oriented strategy if the Target did not have an effec-
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tive staggered board, and hence would also do so for Synergy s..  Then, 
by Proposition 4, we know that if the Target has an effective staggered 
board, the Acquirer will make a strictly larger offer when the Synergy 
is s. than when it is s.  Therefore, we just need to show that the Share-
holders prefer larger offers in the poison pill with an effective stag-
gered board game. 
The proof is very similar to the intuition.  Let the price that the Ac-
quirer offers for Synergy s. be denoted p
.
.  If the true value of the Target 
is such that the Insiders will not sell even at p
.
, the increased Synergy 
has no effect on the Shareholders’ utility.  If the true value of the Tar-
get is such that the Insiders would sell for either p or p
.
, then the Share-
holders are better off as they receive a higher price. Finally, consider 
the interval of true Target values for which the Insiders will not sell at 
the price p, but will sell at price p
.
.  For these Target values, for Synergy 
s the Shareholders receive only v, while for s., they receive p
.
 > v + b, 
and so the Shareholders are better off in this final scenario as well. 
More generally, we can calculate the optimal choice of defenses 
from the perspective of the Shareholders.  If parameter values are 
such that the Acquirer will choose the Insider-Oriented strategy when 
there is no effective staggered board, then the existence of an effec-
tive staggered board has no effect on Shareholders’ utility.  However, 
if the Acquirer will choose the Shareholder-oriented strategy when 
there is no effective staggered board, then there is a difference in wel-
fare for the Shareholders between the two regimes.  In that case, the 
Shareholders prefer an effective staggered board if and only if 
 
̂ . 
Where p* is the offer made by the Acquirer when there is an effective 
staggered board.  Furthermore, it is clear that if the Shareholders pre-
fer an effective staggered board, then the Insiders do as well, as the 
Insiders prefer an effective staggered board if and only if 
 
̂  
and so we have the following result: 
 
Proposition 10.  If the Shareholders prefer an effective staggered board, 
then the Insiders prefer an effective staggered board.   
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 However, it is not the case that the Insiders always prefer an effec-
tive staggered board, as shown in an example in the text in subsection 
II.E.1. 
 
